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I want ... [people] to feel in their turn that exactly as justice must be
done them so they must do justice ... President Theodore Roosevelt'
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of human rights has for the past six decades, like a
river deepening its channel, slowly chipped away at the strata of injus-
tice. Nevertheless, the vaunted words of the Universal Declaration of
Human Right's opening sentence2 continue to be rejected by numerous
state-signatories and inter-state institutions. Indeed, one nascent area
in the human rights arena, where the lack of freedom and injustice is
manifest, is the field of human rights and the environment. This topic
is the subject of the present article.
Examples of the abrogation, by sovereign states, of environmen-
tal rights and its impact upon human rights are legion,4 particularly in
the developing world.5 Moreover, it is now quite clear that Multina-
1. Theodore Roosevelt, It Takes More Than That to Kill a Bull Moose (Oct. 14, 1912).
Available at http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/research/speech%20kill%20moose.htm
(taken from a stenographic report that differs considerably from the prepared manuscript,
because an attempt was made on Roosevelt's life just before he entered the auditorium).
2. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), at
Preamble, available at http://www.un .orglen/documents/udhr/index.shtml. (That sentence
states "[w] here as recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world . . . .")
3. See generally SVITLANA KRAVCHENKO AND JOHN BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2008), Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and Environment Issues in
Multilateral Treaties Adopted between 1991 and 2001 (2002), Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert
Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment 14-16 January 2002, Geneva: Background
Paper No. 1, available at http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/issues/environmentlenviron/
bpl.htm.
4. Francis 0. Adeola, Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Abuse: The States,
MNCs, and Repression of Minority Groups in the World System, 8 HUMAN ECOLOGY REV. 39
(2001), available at http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her8l/81adeola.pdf
5. See e.g., Burma/Myanmar: Vivienne Walt, Chevron, Total Accused of Human-
Rights Abuses in Burma, TIME, July 6, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/
0,8599,2001962,00.html#ixzzliFADaTel. (Burmese government, San Francisco based
Chevron and the French energy giant Total have been accused of posting soldiers to protect
a jointly owned pipeline who dragooned local villagers into manual slave labor.); China:
Joseph Kahn and Jim Yardley, As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com com/2007/08/26/world/asial
26china.html. ("Public health is reeling. Pollution has made cancer China's leading cause of
death, the Ministry of Health says. Ambient air pollution alone is blamed for hundreds of
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tional Corporations ("MNCs") figure, whether directly or indirectly,
into the destruction of the environment and its concomitant violation of
the human rights of indigenous peoples around the world.6 Neverthe-
less, States and MNCs are not the only institutions that abrogate
human rights norms, as a consequence of their despoliation of the
environment. International Organizations, also known as Inter-
governmental Organizations, 7 are also responsible for these types of
harms. This article focuses upon the actions of two international orga-
nizations, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.
It examines how their loan policies effect the global environment and
produce injustices and human rights violations. As part of that discus-
sion, the article delves into the two banks' dispute resolution
procedures, via their respective inspection panels, using the Yacyretd
Hydroelectric Dam as a case study.
A. Declarations, Failures and Consequences
The World Bank Group's ("WBG") International Bank for Re-
construction and Development ("IBRD" or "the Bank") declares that its
aim is "to reduce poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer
countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, guar-
antees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory
services."8 Thus, one would be led to believe, from the cited language,
thousands of deaths each year. Nearly 500 million people lack access to safe drinking
water."); Ecuador: Lawrence Hurley, Oil & Gas: Judge at Heart of Landmark Pollution
Case Unfazed by Spotlight, GREENWIRE, May 17, 2011, http://www.eenews.net/public/
Greenwire/2011/05/17/1. (Ecuador sued Chevron/Texaco over oil contamination "from oil
and gas drilling operation pits, topped with a thick coat of oil open to the elements" and
"including wastewater from drilling operations". Id.); Ethiopia: International Rivers, Gibe
III Dam, Ethiopia, (2011), http://www.internationalrivers.org/africa/gibe-3-dam-ethiopia.
("Ethiopia's plans to build Gibe III Dam now threaten the food security and local economies
that support more than half a million people in southwest Ethiopia and along the shores of
Lake Turkana. Construction began in 2006 with flagrant violations of Ethiopia's own laws
on environmental protection and procurement practices, and the national constitution.")
6. Id. See also, David Kinley and Sarah Joseph, Multinational Corporations and
Human Rights: Questions About Their Relationship, 27 ALTERNATIVE L. REv. 7 (Feb. 2002),
available at http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/projects/arc kinley.pdf; Center for
Constitutional Rights, Settlement Reached in Human Rights Cases Against Royal Dutch
Shell (June 8, 2009), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/settlement-reached-
human-rights-cases-against-royal-dutch/shell; Eduard Gismatullin, Shell Accused of
Misleading Data Over Nigerian Spills, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2011-01-25/shell-accused-of-misleading-data-over-nigerian-spills-updatel-.html.
7. See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAw-MAKERs
(2005).
8. The World Bank, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Working for a World Free of Poverty (2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/SDUHVGE
5S0. (The "IBRD is structured like a cooperative that is owned and operated for the benefit
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that it would therefore be axiomatic that when institutions such as the
IBRD, whose mission is to provide funds for development to the na-
tions of the southern hemisphere, offer "aid" in the form of loans, it
means to improve the quality of life of the average citizen.9 One would,
however, be mistaken.
Similarly, this error in judgment persists when applied to
Multi-Development Banks ("MDB"s).' 0 They too declare that they
were established to assist poor countries with their development, and
in poverty alleviation within their regional purview." These Banks'
noble mission statements notwithstanding, there is a fundamental
shortcoming with institutions such as the IBRD, and its regional
equivalents, the regional Multilateral Development Banks.12 The fail-
ing: these Banks neglect to involve the very people who live within
their loans' project areas, in the development process. Accordingly,
these institutions in the process ignore the actual communities and
people - referred to as "project-affected people" - that they seek to
assist.
of its 187 member countries"; ownership is based on the amount of investment in the
cooperative. The United States is the largest shareholder. Today, the World Bank is the
umbrella organization of three other bodies).
9. For example, the World Bank Group's International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (hereinafter "IBRD" or "Bank") states that its "aims [are] to reduce poverty in
middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries by promoting sustainable development
through loans, guarantees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory
services." The World Bank, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(2008) available at http://go.worldbank.org/SDUHVGE5SO.
10. See "The Inter-American Development Bank, About the IDB: Mission (2008) at
http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/I/mission.cfm?language=English (Thus, the Inter-American
Development Bank ("IADB")'s website for instance, avers that its mission is to "contribute
to the acceleration of the process of economic and social development of the regional
developing member countries, individually and collectively).
11. Id. (The IADB has also declared that it "helps foster sustainable economic and
social development in Latin America and the Caribbean through its lending). See also The
Inter-American Development Bank, IDB Sustainability Portal (2008) at http://www.iadb
.org/sustainability/index.cfm?language=English (The IADB defines sustainability as
follows: "Sustainability at the IDB means promoting development that is equitable and
sustainable, both social and environmentally. It is a concept that frames the Bank's work
toward economic growth and poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean). The
IADB defines Sustainability as follows: "Sustainability at the IDB means promoting
development that is equitable and sustainable, both socially and environmentally. It is a
concept that frames the Bank's work toward economic growth and poverty reduction in
Latin America and the Caribbean."
12. E.g., the Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB"), the Asian Development
Bank ("ADB"), and the African Development Bank ("AFDB").
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In failing to seek public input into a Bank's projects, its execu-
tives,13 who always deal solely with government officials,'1 sequester
themselves away from the very communities they claim will be the
beneficiaries of the foreign direct investments. There is a bitter irony
in this process, since certain governments and international organiza-
tions do not have their constituents' best interest in mind. Given the
foregoing, the following question begs for an answer: is this aid aimed
at playing a positive role in reducing poverty and arresting ecological
degradation? If so, why does "the process of consultation often become
a kind of managed dialogue among elites rather than a forum for au-
thentic popular expression"?'5
Indeed, the results of these conversations among elites have
been that, more often than not, the Banks' projects, rather than lifting
the poor from the morass of poverty, plunges them into further despair
and financial precariousness.16 Consequently, there is a boomerang ef-
fect: the more money is lent, the greater the prolongation of the
injustice and strain that the average citizen in developing countries
feels and is under. In addition, many of these Bank projects, particu-
larly dam construction ventures, have been either total construction or
operational failures, or at best have only been partially successful.' 7
Injury to the environment, disastrous resettlement policies and
decisions, as well as a lack of work for those resettled, are the out-
growth of these projects. Without a doubt, once a Bank financed
project fails, the damage has been done, and attempting to undo it is
akin to squeezing the toothpaste back into the tube. Requests for scru-
13. See World Bank, About Us: Staff (Aug. 5, 2010), http://go.worldbank.org/
B6U4HPNDSO (The World Bank staff is composed of economists, M.B.A.s, lawyers,
educators, financial analysts, and managers, and other highly educated personnel).
14. "[Tlhe World Bank is an international development organization owned by 187
countries-both developed and developing. Its role is to reduce poverty by lending money to
the governments of its poorer members-often called developing countries . . . ." The World
Bank, The Story Behind Youthink! (2011), (emphasis added) available at http://
youthink.worldbank.org/aboutlinside-world-bank.
15. Chi Camody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic
Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
16. See, e.g., Itzchak Kornfeld, A Global Water Apartheid: From Revelation to
Resolution, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 701, 711 (2010) (discussing how the Bolivian
government, under World Bank pressure, made decisions that had a detrimental effect on
the country's population).
17. See, e.g., PETER BOSSHARD, et al., Gambling with People's Lives: What the World
Bank's New "High-Risk/High-Reward" Strategy Means for the Poor and the Environment
(Sept. 2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/EDhigh
risk.pdf. ("The environmental destruction, social upheaval, corruption and repression that
are associated with the World Bank's high-risk projects have created tremendous public
controversy since the 1980s. [footnote omitted]. This is particularly true for large dams, for
projects that affect tropical forests, and for investments in the oil, gas and mining sectors.")
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tiny regarding whether bank policies were followed, submitted to the
IBRD's dispute settlement body, the Inspection Panel' 8 , are an after-
the-fact attempt at remedying an already chronic problem. Moreover,
in many cases, management fights the Inspection Panel's recommen-
dations and endeavors to convince the Bank's directors that the panel
was wholly erroneous and iniquitous in its assessments.
Indeed, the Banks' management, to the detriment of project-af-
fected people, maintain their course with no change in the status quo.
But, assuming that these managers believe in their banks' missions of
helping the poor pull themselves out of their current situation, why do
they seem threatened by independent review and fight changes to fail-
ing projects? One plausible conclusion is that this behavior is rooted
in an institutional intransigence and irreverence for human rights and
the environment. Simply stated, Development Banks are banks whose
management only seeks to have their loans repaid. Everything else is
window dressing.
B. A Road Map to the Article
The IBRD's and IADB's failures have received a good deal of
scrutiny in the literature. Commentators have addressed a variety of
subjects, including the Bank's lack of accountability for human rights
violations,' 9 issues related to public participation, 20 population dis-
placement and resettlement.21 The present article departs from these
subjects and concentrates on an area that has yet to be fully examined:
how the system works, through the "eyes" of a particular project. As
part of this exploration, I posit that dispute settlement procedures of-
fered by the Development Banks is at best wanting. The loan process
is meant, as this author sees it, to maintain management's control not
only over the loan process, but over the borrower. That is, the IDRB
and its four World Bank Group's sisters were designed, in 1944, to deal
18. The Inspection Panel is discussed infra at Part III.
19. See e.g., Dana L. Clark, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The World Bank
and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 205 (2002);
Korrina Horta, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality: Human
Rights and the World Bank, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 227 (2002); Witness for Peace, A People
Damned: The Impact of the World Bank Chixoy Hydroelectric Project in Guatemala,
available at http://www.witnessforpeace.org/apd.html.
20. See, e.g., Camody, supra note 15, at 1323.
21. See, e.g., Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Legal Aspects of Involuntary Population
Displacement, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: POLICY,
PRACTICE AND THEORY 13 (Michael M. Cerna & Scott E. Guggenheim eds., 1993); Michael M.
Cerna, Involuntary Resettlement: Social Research, Policy and Planning, in PUrrING PEOPLE
FIRST: SOCIOLOGICAL VARIABLES IN RuRAL DEVELOPMENT 195 (Michael M. Cerna eds., 1991).
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solely with sovereigns; this is an antiquated Westphalian mindset,
where citizens have no privity in the process and therefore are pre-
cluded from seeking a place at the table.
This case study, therefore, examines the IBRD's and the IADB's
management's decades-long failure to adhere to their respective poli-
cies and procedures, as well as direct circumvention of these policies.
It also reveals the consequences of these failures, which include untold
harm and anguish to the local populations within the Yacyreti pro-
ject's area in both Argentina and Paraguay, including indigenous
peoples. What is also made clear is that Bank personnel have ignored
their responsibility to defend the interests of project-affected people, by
side-stepping Bank procedures. 22 In addition, the Yacyretd case study
examines the Banks' dispute resolution bodies' efforts at identifying
the IBRD's and IADB's deviations from their respective policies and
procedures. It further addresses how their findings and recommenda-
tions were ignored, thereby often reducing the panels' efforts to
pointless exercises. By failing to adhere to their respective policies and
procedures, and circumventing these policies, as well as ignoring the
Inspection Panel's recommendation, the Banks prolong the damage to
the environment and the human rights violations of the affected-
peoples.
My thesis in the present article is as follows: where dam
projects funded and constructed by the IDRB and IADB, in which the
citizens are the intended beneficiaries of these projects are excluded
from the process, tend to falter, at best, and more often than not, fail.
Part II provides a background into the two lending institutions
that have been intertwined with the Yacyret6 Project for decades. Part
III discusses the origin, make-up, and task of the two banks' Inspection
Panels. Part IV presents a detailed history into the development, con-
struction and outcome of the Yacyreth Dam Project, and the human
and environmental rights the Dam has caused. In turn, Part V ad-
dresses the findings of the IBRD's Inspection Panel and its
corresponding body at the IADB. It also examines the despoilment of
the environment and its concomitant violation of the human rights of
the project-affected people. Part VI discusses and analyzes the envi-
ronmental assessment industry. Part VII discusses the second request
for inspection, submitted in 2002, which demonstrates how little was
done in the years since 1996, when the first Request for Inspection was
submitted.
22. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER, Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the
Interests of Projected-Affected People, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 201 (2003); Richard E. Bissell, Recent
Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank, 91 Am. J. INT'L L. 741 (1997).
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II. THE BANKS AND THE SHoALs: THE IDRB AND THE IADB
A. The World Bank Group's International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
The World Bank Group ("WBG") is one of the three original
Bretton Woods institutions.23 The WBG consists of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD")24 and the Interna-
tional Development Association ("IDA").25 Three other agencies,
unrelated to the subject matter of this paper, also fall under the um-
brella of the WBG. 26
The WBG is the largest multilateral development agency in the
world.27 In fiscal year 2005, the World Bank provided $24.7 billion in
loans to its client countries. 28 Similarly, the Bank also coordinates
other donors, mobilizes finances from bilateral and private-sector
sources, and is the accepted leader in the development community.29
23. The two others are the International Money Fund ("IMF") and the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). The latter is headquartered in Geneva while the WBG and IMF are
headquartered in Washington, D.C. For the history and functions of these institutions, see
generally, The Bretton Woods Committee, About, Bretton Woods Institutions, http://
www.brettonwoods.org/index .php/180 /Bretton WoodsInstitutions.
24. The IBRD's mission is "to reduce poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer
countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, guarantees, risk
management products, and analytical and advisory services."World Bank Group, About Us,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2008), http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNALIEXTABOUTUS/EXTIBRD/0,,menuPK:3046081-pagePK:64168427-
piPK:64168435-theSitePK:3046012,00.html.
25. The International Development Association ("IDA") is the arm of the World Bank
that aids the world's poorest nations ("those having per capita annual income below $1465
in 1994 US dollars"). HUNTER, supra note 22, at n. 5. Established in 1960, IDA endeavors to
lessen poverty by offering interest-free credits and grants for proposals that increase
financial development, decrease inequity and enhance people's livelihoods. World Bank
Group, About Us, International Development Association, What is the IDA? (2008), http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/O,,contentMDK:21206704-
pagePK:51236175-piPK:437394-theSitePK:73154,00.html.
26. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) all make up the World Bank Group. The World Bank Group, About Us:
Organization (2008), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALJ/EXTABOUTUS/
0,,contentMDK:20040580-menuPK: 1696997-pagePK:51123644-piPK:329829-theSitePK:
29708,00.html.
27. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 203.
28. In Fiscal 2007, the IBRD loaned $12.8 billion for 112 new operations in 34
countries; the IDA extended commitments in the amount of $11.9 billion for 189 new
operations in 64 countries. The World Bank, About Us, 2007 Annual Report (2011), http://
go.worldbank.org/A2QP25LQXO.
29. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 203. See generally World Bank, About Us, Articles of
Agreement (2008), http://go.worldbank.org/BAEZH92NHO. See also Jude Webber, More
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One major stumbling block for citizens is the IBRD's opacity. For ex-
ample, the Bank's meeting minutes and voting records are hidden from
the public, thereby hampering any effort at transparency.30 The latter
fact is particularly disturbing since the money that is being contrib-
uted by the Member-States comes from each of their public fisks.
Additionally, this mindset governs the IBRD's Board of Executive Di-
rectors and its Board of Governors in setting policies, and is
consequently translated by management into the Bank's day-to-day
operations.
B. The Inter-American Development Group
In many ways, the IADB is a mirror image of the World Bank
Group. The IADB (or "IDB") Group is composed of the "IDB, the Inter-
American Investment Corporation (IIC) and the Multilateral Invest-
ment Fund (MIF). The IIC focuses on support for small and medium-
sized businesses, while the MIF promotes private sector growth
through grants and investments."3 1 The IADB was formed in 1959 and
is owned by forty-seven member nations,32 including Croatia, Sweden,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and includes, among others,
many constituent nations within the Caribbean and Latin American
Basin. 33
Pressure on the Debt Front, www.ft.com, (Sept. 26, 2011),, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/
2011/09/26/argentina-more-pressure-on-the-debt-front/#axzzliLw2VRRO. (Voting at both
the Board of Executive Directors and at the Board of Governors is based upon a country's
percentage contribution to the Bank's working capital. The United States has the largest
voting share, at 30 percent "and 17 percent at the IADB.")
30. See e.g., Toby J. McIntosh, World Bank Proposal Said to Undercut Access Policy,
http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/10/world-bank-proposal-said-to-undercut-access-policy.
(The P4R proposal would allow Bank funding without requiring application of the Bank's
environmental and social safeguard policies. The Bank would approve a "program" for a
recipient country, not specific projects. The overall goal is to expand the influence of the
Bank safeguard policies to more government programs . . .") See also Bruce Jenkins, World
Bank and IMF Launch Disclosure Reviews, Bretton Woods Project (Apr. 23, 2009), http://
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564203. ("Civil society groups ... [are] painfully aware of
information access problems at the World Bank .. . Communities and individuals are often
unable to participate in Bank decisions and lack information to hold decision makers
accountable.")
31. The World Bank, supra note 9. (Discussing the purpose and functions of the IDB).
32. "The current distribution of voting power is as follows: the 26 Latin American and
Caribbean states, 50.02 percent; the United States, 30 percent; Canada, 4 percent; the 16
European countries, Israel and the Republic of Korea, 10.98 percent; and Japan, 5 percent."
Inter-American Development Bank, About the IDB: Ownership (2008), http://www.iadb.org/
aboutus/I/ownership.cfm?language=English. (URL no longer available)
33. THE Inter-American Development Bank, About the IDB: Board of Governors (2008),
http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/IV/gogovernors.cfm?language=English.
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From its inception through December 31, 2007, "the Bank had
approved over $156 billion in loans and guarantees to finance projects
with investments totaling $353 billion, as well as $2.4 billion in grants
and contingent-recovery technical cooperation financing."34 With re-
gard to the Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, IADB financing through
2000 was $840 million.3 5 The Banks' dispute resolution bodies are dis-
cussed next.
III. THE INSPECTION PANELS AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
A. Genesis: The Lead-Up to Creation
From its inception in 1944 until the early 1990's, the IBRD was
considered to be a "lawless" and "a 'renegade' institution, subject to no
meaningful set of laws or binding standards."3 6 Because of its status
as a non-state actor, the Bank "enjoys immunity from national courts,
and international law provides only limited recourse against the
Bank."3 7 Nevertheless, borrowers and contractors, who have con-
tracted with the Bank, can bring actions that are related to loan
agreements or contracts before one of the WBGs' arms, the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). The
ICSID is a forum for the arbitration of investment disputes.38
However, as noted above, the opportunity to seek relief is un-
available to project-affected people, even though they are considered
third party beneficiaries of the Banks' loans. The reasons: (1) they
have no privity with the Bank; and (2) the Bank only deals with state
entities.
34. Inter-American Development Bank, About the IDB: What Does the IDB Do? (2008),
http://www.iadb.orglaboutus/II/index.cfm?language=English. Located in Washington, D.C.,
the Bank is staffed by some 2,000 professionals and administrative staff, not including the
Board of Executive Directors and the Office of Evaluation and Oversight. "At the end of
2005, Bank staff funded by the administrative budget, excluding the Board of Executive
Directors and the Office of Evaluation and Oversight, totaled 1,852, of whoml,411 were
professional and 441 administrative staff." Inter-American Development Bank, About the
IDB: Bank Staff (2008), http://www.iadb.org/aboutus/IV/bankstaff.cfm?language=English.
35. Inter-American Development Bank, Independent Investigative Mechanism,
Statistical Data (1996), http://www.iadb.org/cont/poli/yacyreta/statse.htm.
36. HUNrER, supra note 22, at 203.
37. Id.
38. See generally The World Bank, supra note 28. (noting that the ICSID helps
encourage foreign investment by providing international facilities for conciliation and
arbitration of investment disputes, thereby helping foster an atmosphere of mutual
confidence between states and foreign investors).
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Of course, this is the traditional catch-22 that non-State actors
encounter within the regime of public international law. If the Bank is
accountable to anyone, it is accountable solely to the governments of
the 185 states that have a cooperative interest in it, because only sov-
ereign states are the subjects of international law. This premise,
however, is based upon the faulty conclusion that nations are the pro-
tectors of their citizens' rights and will represent these rights within
the realm of international law, e.g., they will utilize their political sway
before international organizations. Not surprisingly, this legal fiction
withers away when one looks at the reality of human rights violations
by States.39
B. The Assault on the Citadel
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the late 1980s and early
1990s, citizens began to challenge the IBRD's policies. The attack on
the citadel - the Bank - came from two separate directions. Beginning
in the early 1990s, the Bank and its two Bretton Woods sister institu-
tions were the subject of an "NGO swarm" - the harassment by
"amorphous groups of NGOs, linked online, descending on a target."40
In 1994, the World Bank was targeted by the "Fifty Years is Enough
campaign."41 This impetus was followed by two similar phenomena:
the targeting of the International Monetary Fund's Annual Meeting in
1998, and the "Seattle Shock," during the 1999 World Trade Organiza-
tion's Ministerial Conference in Seattle.42  One commentator has
39. See generally, PHILIP ALSTON, ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (3d ed. 2008); ROGER NORMAND, ET. AL, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN:
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE (2008); Yuval Shany, The Prohibition
Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Punishment: Can
Absolute be Relativized Under Existing International Law?, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 837 (2007).
40. See Citizen's Group: The Non-Governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratise, or
Merely Disrupt, Global Governance?, in THE ECONOMIST (Dec.. 11, 1999), available at http://
www.economist.com/node/266250 (citing the Rand Corporation study wherein David
Ronfeldt and John Arquilla coined the phrase "NGO swarm").
41. Id. (noting that in 1994, protesters dominated the World Bank's anniversary
meeting with a 'Fifty Years is Enough' campaign, and forced a rethink of the Bank's goals
and methods.")
42. The "Seattle Shock"as Business Week called it in an editorial that warned of a
popular backlash against "our very economic system"-reflects heartfelt indignation by the
financial press at the intrusion of mass democracy into an elite discourse . . . the
demonstrators want to democratize what has been an elite decision-making process, to
challenge the global dominance of capital and capital's state institutions. See William K.
Tabb, After Seattle: Understanding the Politics of Globalization, MONTHLY REVIEW (Mar.
2000), http://www.monthlyreview.org/300tabb.htm.
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observed that "[i]n each instance, the NGOs' public criticisms led to
institutional soul searching."43
In addition, most NGOs felt that the IBRD was taking refuge
behind an "insulated position in international law."4 4 Accordingly, the
second front involved two phases. First, the Bank was cajoled into
adopting social and environmental policies that, among other things,
established norms for access to information, environmental assess-
ment, involuntary resettlement and public consultation, which were to
be employed as integral parts of future projects. The second phase
targeted the IBRD's procedures. These procedural steps, especially
those providing access to information and public consultation, were
aimed at addressing two communities: project-affected people, and the
Bank's employees.
The latter were mandated to put into place the use of environ-
mental factors in assessing project feasibility. Moreover, when project-
affected people were displaced, the Bank's employees were to ensure
that those who were resettled received comparable work and lodging to
those that they were required to give up. The Bank's staff was also
required to establish a program for the distribution of project informa-
tion to indigenous communities who would be affected by the Bank's
projects. These and other changes were initiated at the very top of the
Bank's management, by none other than its then President, Lewis
Preston, who was appointed in 1991. "Preston made a clear link be-
tween poverty and environmental degradation. In a 1992 address to
the World Resources Institute, he claimed that alleviation of poverty
would eliminate many of the environmentally destructive actions in
the developing world and would benefit the world environment."45
43. Camody, supra note 15, at 1325.
44. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 204.
45. See The World Bank, Archives, Lewis Thompson Preston, 8th President of the World
Bank Group, 1991 - 1995, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/,,contentMDK:20505265-pagePK:36726-piPK:437378-
theSitePK:29506,00.html.
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Beginning in 1987, under the leadership of Barber Conable,4 6
Preston's predecessor, a top to bottom reorganization 4 7 took place. At
that time there was also serious doubt about the Bank's purpose as a
multilateral lender in a world of copious private capital; NGOs such as
"Fifty Years is Enough" asserted that the Bank's role was superfluous
when private capital was extremely abundant.48 In addition, the ap-
proaching membership of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc States
was about to place great demands - as well as accompanying require-
ments - upon the institution.49 Lastly, the harsh censure the Bank
received during its fiftieth anniversary, became increasingly "strident,
culminating in large protests during the Annual Meetings in
Madrid."50
During this time, the Bank issued its fifteenth World Develop-
ment Report,51 which highlighted the environment, and described the
World Bank Group's shift to its subsequent stage of environmental
work. One part of this environmental focus was to put into place envi-
ronmental policies, and to ensure that these strategies were adhered
to.5 2 Closely related to the environmental programs were policies and
46. Upon his appointment, Conable was shocked to learn that the five major
shareholders in the Bank refused to endorse the budget proposed" by his predecessor A. W.
Clausen. The critics focused on the Bank's administrative budget, which they saw as a
bloated, overgrown bureaucracy. These criticisms persuaded Conable that reforms needed
to be made, and that it was his mandate to cut costs and restore efficiency within the Bank.
See The World Bank, Archives, Barber Conable, 7th President of the World Bank Group,
1986 - 1991 (2008) available at http:/ /web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXT
ABOUTUSIEXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20487104-pagePK36726-piPK:437378-the
SitePK 29506,00.html.
47. The changes in the Bank's organization were drastic. The rapid and substantial
change caused personal stress, organizational tension, and major disruptions in the work
process. Four hundred staff positions were cut, and the entire staff had to re-apply for the
newly created positionsId.
48. Archives, Lewis Thompson Preston, 8th President of the World Bank Group, 1991 -
1995, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992 DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992). The 1992
Development Report was the fifteenth in the annual series assessing major development
issues. The World Development Report 1992 explored the links between economic
development and the environment. The 1990 Report on Poverty, 1991's Report on
Development Strategies, and this report constitute a trilogy on the goals and means of
development. "The main message of this year's [1992] report is the need to integrate
environmental considerations into development policymaking." The World Bank, Data &
Research, World Development Report 1992: Development and The Environment, Vol. 1
(1992), http://go.worldbank.org/GE1X61ITRO.
52. "Over time, those . . . in the NGO community came to believe that the policy
framework was either largely ignored or implemented according to the discretion of project
officers based on their own interests or those of the borrowing government." HUNTER, supra
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actions concerning the relocation of indigenous project-affected
people.53
C. The Arousal and the Beast
Prior to Mr. Preston's assumption of the Presidency, the Bank
was assailed by NGOs, specifically the India-based Narmada Bachao
Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement), 54 that confronted the Bank
regarding the funding of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada
River. In response to the Narmada firestorm, which began in the mid
1980's55 , Conable commissioned an independent study to be headed by
Bradford Morse.56 The Morse Commission's report, which was deliv-
ered to the Bank during Preston's tenure, stated in no uncertain terms
that the Bank's accomplishments on resettlement and environmental
issues had "fallen short" of its policies and guidelines.57
note 22 at n. 8, (citing Bradford Morse and Thomas Berger, Sardar Sarovar: Report of the
Independent Review (Resource Futures Int'l 1992) (chronicling the Bank's failure to ensure
policy compliance in the controversial Sardar Sarovar dam projects on India's Narmada
River).
53. Preston, 8th President, supra note 45.
54. See e.g., Friends of River Narmada, The Sardar Sarovar Dam:A Brief Introduction
(Last Updated May 10, 2006), http://www.narmada.org/sardarsarovar.html Narmada
Activists Court Arrest, Say Govt Misled SC, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 23, 2011, http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-12-23/bhopal/30551564_1_land-acquisition-tribals-
villages; Niluksi Koswanage Analysis: No stopping big hydro projects, despite Lao veto,
REUTERS, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-dams-idUSTRE
7BDOGN20111214.
55. "Like any large river valley development scheme, the NVDP will lead to large-scale
submergence of land and thus also the displacement of those communities for whom this
land provides habitat, livelihood and lifeworld. And for this reason, the projects have
become the object of intense contestation by the communities that stand to be affected by
submergence and displacement. From the mid-1980s onwards, social action groups working
with dam-affected adivasi (indigenous) groups and gradually also in caste Hindu farming
communities in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh started an intense questioning
of the responsible authorities as to the prospects for fair and adequate resettlement and
rehabilitation." Alf Gunvald Nilsen, The River and The Rage: Dispossession and Resistance
in the Narmada Valley, India (Undated), at 2 - 3. University of Nottingham Centre for the
Study of Social and Global Justice, available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cssgj/
documents/working-papers/wp005.pdf
56. F. Bradford Morse, a five term-former Republican Congressman from
Massachusetts spent thirteen years as top-ranking United Nations official, including as
"head of the United Nations Development Program, which helps finance and administer
development projects in more than 150 nations, Mr. Morse became an advocate for aid to
poor countries and for victims of famine in Africa." Jennifer Kingson Bloom, Bradford
Morse Is Dead at 73; Held High-Ranking U.N. Posts, N.Y. Times (Dec. 1994), available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CEFD61238F93AA25751ClA9629582
60.
57. Preston, 8th President, supra note 45.
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Following the Morse Commission's findings, NGOs, including
the United States-based Center for International Environmental Law
("CIEL"),58 the Environmental Defense Fund,59 the Bank Information
Center,60 Friends of the Earth61 and many others, pressed Congress as
well as the Parliaments of Germany and Switzerland to hold public
hearings on why the Bank should continue to be funded. Congress and
the Swiss Parliament held hearings and took testimony on the "poten-
tial for an accountability mechanism" 62 for the Bank. Given what they
heard, the governments of the United States and a number of other
donor governments advised the Bank's directors that they would link
any increased funding of the Bank to the formation "of an independent,
transparent, and citizen-based accountability mechanism. Faced with
this pressure, the Bank proposed an 'Independent Inspection Panel' in
the summer of 1993."63
The Morse Commission served as a prototype for a new Bank
institution.6 4 On September 22, 1993, the Executive Directors of the
IBRD and the IDA created an independent body: the Inspection Panel
58. "The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) is a nonprofit
organization working to use international law and institutions to protect the environment,
promote human health, and ensure a just and sustainable society." The Center for
International Environmental Law, About, (last updated Sept. 26, 2007) at http://
www.ciel.org/reciel.html
59. Founded in 1967 as the Environmental Defense Fund, is an environmental Non-
Governmental Organization that specializes in employing science and cooperative
approaches to tackle environmental. Environmental Defense Fund, About Us (2011), http://
www.edf.org/about.
60. The Bank Information Center (BIC) partners with civil society in developing and
transition countries to influence the World Bank and other international financial
institutions (IFIs) to promote social and economic justice and ecological sustainability. BIC
is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization that advocates for the
protection of rights, participation, transparency, and public accountability in the
governance and operations of the World Bank, regional development banks, and IMF. Bank
Information Center, About the Bank Information Center (2012), http://www.bicusa.org/en/
Page.About.aspx.
61. "Since our founding in 1969, Friends of the Earth has spent 39 years fighting for
the environment. Our history is marked by victories across the years and our commitment
to the environment." Friends of the Earth, Our History (2011), http://action.foe.org/t/6545/
content.jsp?key=3653.
62. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 205.
63. Id. See also, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Res. No 93-
10 and International Development Association, Res. No IDA 93-6, reprinted in 34 ILM 520
(1995) (hereinafter Panel Resolution). The Bank released several drafts of the Panel
proposal, which were subsequently circulated in secret to the U.S. Congress and to several
NGOs. NGOs provided comments to the U.S. Treasury and Congress, as well as to officials
of other governments.
64. Id.
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for both the IBRD and the IDA. 65 The Panel's mandate is to act as an
independent forum and to investigate complaints that it receives from
project-affected private citizens or groups, who feel aggrieved by the
Bank's failure to abide by its loan policies and procedures vis a vis the
design, appraisal or implementation of development projects.66
Indeed, Dr. Ibrahim Shihata, a former Bank General Counsel
and "the legal architect"6 7 of the Panel, has observed that the Bank
established the Inspection Panel more because it had to than because
it wanted to. In his words the Bank was "driven by a broader concern
that international organizations were not adequately accountable for
their activities and by the perception that the Bank, as an important
instrument of public policy in areas of international concern, need[s] to
be more open and responsive."68 In 1994, by separate resolutions, the
regional MDB's, following the Bank's lead, created their own inspec-
tion panels. 69
D. The IBRD's Inspection Panel
Never Let the Truth Get in the Way of a Good Story70
The IBRD's first Inspection Panel members were appointed on
September 22, 1993.71 The Panel is composed of three members, 72 a
65. The World Bank Group, The Inspection Panel, About Us (2011), http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64129249
-pagePK:64132081-piPK:64132052-theSitePK:380794,00.html.
66. Preston, 8th President, supra note 45. See also, Inspection Panel, The Inspection
Panel for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International
Development Association: Operating Procedures, reprinted in 34 ILM 510, 511 (1995). For a
general discussion of how the Panel operates, see Dana L. Clark, A Citizen's Guide to the
World Bank Inspection Panel (CIEL 2d ed. 1999), available at http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/citizensguide.pdf.
67. Bissell, supra note 22 at 741.
68. SHIHATA, IBRAHIM F. I., THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 9 (Oxford University
Press, 2d ed. 1999).
69. See e.g., IADB Board Resolution: "The IDB Independent Investigation Mechanism",
Approved Aug. 10, 1994. See also, Gay Davis Miller, The Independent Investigation
Mechanism of the Inter-American Development Bank in The World Bank's Inspection Panel:
A Different Complaints Procedure 209 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Rolf Ring, eds. 2000).
70. Attributed to J. Frank Dobie. The Big Apple, "Never let the facts get in the way of a
good story", Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new-york-city/entry/never
let the factsgetinthe way ofa-good-story.
71. The Inspection Panel, About Us (2012), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNALJEXTINSPECTIONPANEL/O,,menuPK:64129249-pagePK:64132081-piPK:
64132052-theSitePK:380794,00.html
72. Id. ("The Panel consists of three members who are appointed by the Board for non-
renewable periods of five years . . . In addition to the three Panel members; an Executive
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chairperson and two panel members, who pursuant to the Panel's oper-
ating rules, cannot have been previously employed by the Bank. Each
Panel member is chosen based on his or her related experience73 and
serves a single five year term.74 All three are chosen based on their
decades-long careers in the field of development.7 5
The Panel is invested with its own approved procedures, which
are available in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese,76 and are
thereby accessible to a large number of potentially affected communi-
ties across the globe. It's jurisdiction is limited solely to reviewing
whether the Bank, in carrying out its loan obligations, ensured compli-
ance with its policies, and whether deviations from these policies
caused harm or injury to project-affected people, (i.e., it may only eval-
uate whether the Bank's performance measured-up to the standards
set forth within the Bank's operational policies and procedures).77
Thus, the Inspection Panel is precluded from determining whether
Bank officials acted appropriately within the framework of its policies
and procedures. Nor is the Panel charged with overruling Bank poli-
cies or procedures.78
Indeed, the IBRD's Board of Executive Directors clearly antici-
pated that this "new mechanism" would advance the IBRD's
conformity with its policies more faithfully.79 The Directors also antic-
Secretariat assists and supports all Panel activities. The Panel is independent of Bank
Management and is provided with separate resources to discharge its functions.")
73. Id. ("Members are selected on the basis of their ability to deal thoroughly and
fairly with the requests brought to them, their integrity and independence from Bank
Management, and their exposure to developmental issues and living conditions in
developing countries.")
74. Id. (The current chair, Alf Morten Jerve is from Norway The two panel members
are, Roberto Lenton, Ph.D., and Eimi Watanabe, Ph.D., of Japan. Their backgrounds are
available at the Panel's website: The Inspection Panel, Current Panel Members (2012),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAIIEXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:
20173248-menuPK:64129260-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.
html.
75. See e.g., The Inspection Panel,Current Panel Members (2012) http://web.worldbank
.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20173248-menuPK:
64129260-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html. (ALF MORTEN
JERVE, THE PANEL'S CHAIRPERSON "has been engaged in a wide range of development
activities including extensive field research in Africa and Asia.")
76. The Inspection Panel, Operating Procedure - English (2012) http://web.worldbank
.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/O,,contentMDK:20175161-isCURL:Y
-menuPK:64129254-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html,
77. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 205.
78. Id.
79. THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT/THE WORLD
BANK ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARs ON 20 (2003),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/TenYear8_07.pdf.
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ipated that an independent body would demonstrate greater
transparency and increased accountability.80 It is also clear that the
Board felt that these goals could only be achieved if the Panel was com-
pletely independent of the Bank's management.8 1
Accordingly, the Panel's role is narrowly tailored. Its task,
which is triggered when it receives a request for inspection, i.e., a com-
plaint,82 is to inquire and recommend based on the request, whether
the Panel will undertake a preliminary review of the request for in-
spection and the response of management. They then independently
assess the information and recommend to the Board of Executive Di-
rectors whether or not the concerns raised in the complaint warrant
investigation. 83 If, based on the Panel's recommendations, the Board
determines that a given request merits investigation, the Panel pro-
ceeds with data and information collection. 84 This compilation of
related facts and figures includes, where warranted, traveling to the
project area. The Panel then provides its findings, independent assess-
ment and conclusions to the Board.85 On the basis of the Panel's
findings and management's recommendations, the Executive Directors
will consider the actions, if any, to be taken by the Bank.86
From a dispute settlement perspective, the Panel's mandate
and procedures are quite flawed. The IP is solely an investigative
("In establishing the Panel, the Bank's Board of Executive Directors clearly expected that
this new mechanism would promote the Bank's compliance with its policies more
adequately . .. The Board of Executive Directors believed that those objectives could be met
only if the Panel was completely independent of Bank Management.").
80. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International
Development Association, Resolution No. IBRD 93-10, Resolution No. IDA 93-6, "The World
Bank Inspection Panel" (Sept. 22, 1993).
81. The Inspection Panel 10 Years On, supra note 80 at 15. ("The decision in 1993 by
the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors to create an Inspection Panel that, although
an integral part of the Bank, would enjoy complete independence from Bank Management
and staff members was indeed an imaginative, courageous, and pace-setting act.").
Nevertheless, as will be discussed infra the Panel's independence goes only so far.
82. See generally, The Inspection Panel, How to File a Request for Inspection (2011),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAIJEXTINSPECTIONPANEL/O,,contentMDK:
21911332-menuPK:566350-pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00
.html.
83. The Inspection Panel 10 Years On, supra note 80, at 20. ("Therefore, the Panel
reports directly to the Bank's Board; its reports go directly to the Board without being
reviewed by any other party, including Bank Management, or by those who submit a
Request for Inspection. The reports are published exactly as written.").
84. Inspection Panel, How to File, supra note 83, at How are Requests Processed?
85. Id.
86. Id.
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body, when the Bank's Board allows such.87 The Panel can only make
recommendations, which the Executive Directors, at their discretion,
can either accept or reject.88 Moreover, under the current process, the
Bank's management can and often does, challenge the Panel's findings.
That is, the IP is put in the position of being the investigated party,
having to prove the correctness of its findings based upon its investiga-
tion.89 Accordingly, the IP is neither a tribunal nor a court.90 It is akin
to a Presidential or Congressional commission, whose reports are left
to gather dust once they are submitted. Moreover, as will become ap-
parent below from the Yacyreti case study, once the tumult that led to
the Panel's creation died down, the status quo ante seems to have
returned.
E. The Inter-American Development Bank's Investigative Mechanism
As noted previously the IADB - as well as the other MDBs -
followed the IBRD's lead in organizing their own respective inspection
panels. The IADB however calls its panel the "Independent Investiga-
tion Mechanism" ("IIM").91 One key difference between the two
investigative bodies is that unlike the Inspection Panel, the IIM is not
a permanent body. Rather, the IADB, during the early 2000s hired
87. The Inspection Panel, Panel Process (2012), ("An investigation is not automatic,
and can only be authorized by the Board of Executive Directors. If the Board approves an
investigation, the next step is the substantive phase of the inspection process when the
Panel evaluates the merits of the Request."), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20173251-menuPK:64129467-
pagePK:64129751-piPK:64128378-theSitePK:380794,00.html.
88. Id. Once the investigation phase is complete, the Panel submits its Investigation
Report to the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank copying Bank Management. Bank
Management then has six weeks to submit to the Board its Report and Recommendation in
response to the Panel's findings. The Board meets to consider both the Panel's Investigation
Report and Management's recommendations, and decides whether to approve the
Management's recommendations which are intended to bring the Project into compliance in
accordance with Bank policies and procedures. The Board may, at this stage, ask the Panel
to verify whether Management conducted appropriate consultations with the Requesters
and affected people prior to approving Management's recommendations for remedial
measures.
89. Id.
90. Dissatisfaction with the current trajectory of the IP has caused a number of
scholars to suggest that it should function like a tribunal. See e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco &
Alison K. Guernsey, The World Bank's Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability
Through Arbitration, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 577, 580, 621 (2008).
91. For the Independent Investigation Mechanism's policies and procedures, see
generally, IIM Policy (2008) at http://www/iadb.org/cont/poli/mechanism.pdf.
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consultants on an as needed basis.92 Today, the IIM, like the IDB's IP,
is populated by a dedicated group of experts. 93
The IIM's procedures are very similar to those of the IBRD.
Thus, they need not be further elaborated upon. We now turn to the
IBRD's and the IADB's panels' findings in their respective investiga-
tions of the Yacyretd Dam Project.
IV. THE YACYRETA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
No one has ever managed to make the World Bank step back from a
project before. Least of all a ragtag army of the poorest people in one
of the world's poorest countries.94
After more than fourteen years under construction with invest-
ments (including interest) surpassing $8.5 billion, the Yacyreta
Hydroelectric Project remains riddled with problems, delays and un-
certainties that cast serious doubts about the Project's future and its
continued adverse effects on adjacent populations.9 5
The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, named after an island in
the middle of the Parand River, is a joint venture between the govern-
ments of Argentina and Paraguay.96 The Parand forms the border
between the two countries and the YacyretA straddles it. The project's
main objective is to provide hydroelectric energy for use in Argentina's
electric grid.9 7 The total designed amount of power that is expected to
92. The Inter-American Development Bank, Independent Investigation Mechanism,
2003 Annual Report 3 (May 21, 2004) ("the Board of Executive Directors authorized the
establishment of an investigative panel made up of Mr. Walter Leal Filho (Chair), Mr. Julio
Ruiz Murrieta, and Mr. Arthur Heyman."), http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.
aspx?docnum=316174.
93. See generally, The Inter-American Development Bank, IDB establishes the First
Panel of Experts of Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (ICIM) (2012),
("The Inter-American Development Bank appointed five independent experts to serve on
the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (ICIM) Panel."), http://
www.iadb.org/en/micilidb-establishes-the-first-panel-of-experts-of-independent-
consultation-and-investigation-mechanism-icim,3219.html.
94. Arundhati Roy, THE COST OF LIVING 30 (India's National Magazine, 1999).
95. World Bank, The Inspection Panel, Review of Problems and Assessment of Action
Plans, Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project : at Executive Summary:
Findings (Sept. 16, 1997), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent
Server/WDSP/IB/2004/06/15/000265513_20040615163905/Rendered/PDF/29064.pdf.
96. The World Bank, Inspection Panel, Report and Recommendation, Request for
Inspection, Argentina Paraguay Yacyertd Hydroelectric Project (1966), at Background, A.1.
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/04/16/
000265513_20040416103446/Rendered1PDF/28468.pdf.
97. Business News Americas, Yacyretd's 2011 Production up 6% -Argentina, Paraguay
(2011), http://www.bnamericas.com/news/electricpower/yacyretas-2011-production-up-6.
("Argentina's Yacyretd hydroelectric dam on the Argentine-Paraguayan border generated a
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be generated at a reservoir water level of 83 meters above sea level
("masl")98 is 3,200 Megawatts.99 The Yacyretd Dam has been under
construction since at least 1978, and has cost over $10 billion - some
five times its original cost estimate.10 0
The Project is being developed on the Parand pursuant to a
binational treaty between Argentina and Paraguay, The Treaty of
Asunci6n,101 signed on December 3, 1973, and ratified by both states in
1974.102 The treaty, which was conceived as an instrument for devel-
oping an eighty kilometer (approx. fifty mile) stretch of the Parand
River between Encarnaci6n, Paraguay and Posadas, Argentina,, 03 lays
out the intentions of the parties regarding the dam and its opera-
tion.104 Two of the objectives in the instrument relevant to this case
study are (1) the creation of a binational entity, the Entidad Binacional
Yacyretd (Yacyreta Binational Authority) or EBY; 05 and (2) the terms
required for purchase of the land, from project-affected people among
others, that is to be flooded.106
record 20.8TWh of power in 2011 . . . Of the total, 18.7TWh went to Argentina's SADI grid
and 2.18TWh to the SINP Paraguay grid.")
98. With regards to the importance of the reservoir level see text accompanying notes
121-123, infra.
99. Inter-American Development Bank, Press Release, IDB Board of Directors Discuss
Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, (Aug. 5, 2004). ("The 3,200 MW Yacyreti Hydroelectric
Project is located in the Parand River along the border between Argentina and Paraguay."),
http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2004-08-05/idb-board-of-directors-discuss-
yacyreta-hydroelectric-project,569.html.
100. See e.g., Dannin M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz (eds.), Paraguay: A Country
Study (Itaipd, Yacyretd, and Corpus, 1988), http://countrystudies.us/paraguay/49.htm.
("Yacyretd was not expected to become fully operational until the mid-1990s, more than
twenty years after the treaty's signing and at a cost of as much as US$10 billion, five times
the original calculation.")
101. Yacyretd Treaty (Asunci6n, December 3, 1973), has been expanded through
numerous amendment letters. The World Bank Management's Response to the Request for
Inspection Submitted to the Inspection Panel on September 30, 1996, regarding, Argentina-
Second Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project (Lns. 2854-AR and 3520-AR), at 5 9[ 2.1 (Oct. 29,
1996).
102. Juan Rodrigo Walsh, Major Infrastructure Projects, Biodiversity and the
Precautionary Principle: The Case of the Yacyretd Dam and Iberd Marshes, 13 REV. OF EUR.
AND INT'L ENVrL L. 61, 63 (2004). See e.g., Law 20.646 of Argentina (1974) (The instrument
was also incorporated into the national law of each state)..
103. Id. at 63.
104. Id. at n. 15 and accompanying text.
105. The Entidad Binacional Yacyretd, has been characterized as "[niotoriously corrupt
bi-national agency which is supervising completion of the Yacyretd dam project."
International Rivers, Yacyretd Dam (undated), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/latin-
america/paraguay-paran%C3%Al-basinlyacyret%C3%Al-dam.
106. Id. ("In 1994, Yacyretd's floodgates were closed and the reservoir partially filled,
flooding river islands that were home to endemic species, decimating fish populations, and
causing the expulsion of 15,000 people from their homes. . . . At this writing, a battle rages
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EBY is a corporation established by Argentina and Paraguay,
and is jointly owned by these two States. Its mission is to manage the
dam's construction; resettle those people who have been displaced; to
operate the hydroelectric plant, navigation locks and fish ladders; as
well as an extensive infrastructure agenda, which includes construc-
tion of irrigation and intake dikes to prevent flooding, relocation and
resettlement of project-affected people and environmental impact miti-
gation.107 The IRBD and IADB loaned funds to Argentina and
Paraguay, who then funnel these funds to EBY. EBY itself has also
applied for and received loans from both Banks.108
The IDBR has been involved in the in the Yacyretd Hydroelec-
tric Project since the mid-1970s. It entered into a number of
agreements and amendments with the governments of the Republic of
Argentina, and the Republic of Paraguay, as well as with EBY.
Through fiscal year 1995, the bank loaned both governments at least
$941.5 million.109 Similarly, the IADB has been financing the project
to increase the height of the reservoir, thus putting 80,000 people in danger of being flooded
out").
107. Id.
108. In 1987 Canada's Export Development Corporation ("EDC") agreed to lend EBY
$86.4 (U.S.) million to "finance the sale of four Canadian General Electric turbines for the
Yacyreta dam on the Parani River." Patricia Adams, Probe International Submission to the
Export Development Act Review. (Dec. 21, 1998) http://www.probeinternational.org/catalog/
content fullstory.php?contentId=1673. (Canada has also extended loans for the remaining
sixteen turbines. On Just 26, 1987, the $270 million contract for the supply of twenty large
hydraulic turbines for the Yacreta Hydroelectric Project was signed by the Entidad
Binacional Yacyreta... and by Voith Hydro, Inc., of York, Pennsylvania, and Canadian
General Electric of Montreal, Canada. Under the terms of the contract, nine turbine unites
will be supplied by Voith Hydro, Inc. from its York, Pennyslvania plant; four units by
Canadian General Electric [CGE] of Montreal and seven units by Metanac, a consortium of
Argentine manufacturers, who will utilize technology and technical assistance from Voith
and CGE.) U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Scientific & Technical Information, Energy
Citations Database, Bibliographic Citation, Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project Contract Signed
(Sept. 1, 1987) (Last Updated June 16, 2008) available at http: www.osti.gov/
energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti id=5538216.
109. Loan 1761-AR for $210 million (Yacyreta hydroelectric project approved FY 80);
Loan 2998-AR for $252 million (Electric Power Sector Project approved in FY 89); loan 3281-
AR for $100 million (Water Supply and Sewerage Project approved FY 91); loan 3521-AR for
$20 million (flood rehabilitation project proved in FY 93); financing of $300 million under
loan 3520-AR (second Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, approved in September 1992 and
subsequently in August 1994 with an additional amount of $146.6 million, which was
reallocated from the uncommitted balance of love 2854-AR (SEGBA V power distribution
project) to finance Yacyreta components including the resettlement and environmental
protection plan for the project. Furthermore, in February 1995, the board approved a loan
of $46.5 million to the Republic of Paraguay (loan to read 3842-PA), "of which $1.2 million is
to finance the simple works related to the resettlement activities under the Yacyretd
Project." International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inspection Panel, Report
and Recommendation of the Inspection Panel, Request for Inspection, Argentina IParaguay
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since 1978, and along with the IDBR, extended credit in an amount
exceeding $1.8 billion. The overall project was originally estimated to
cost $2.1 billion. However, due to various problems and allegations of
corruption, the project costs have exceeded $11.5 billion and at this
writing it is still ten years behind schedule." 0
Construction of the overall project began in 1978. However, the
dam's construction began in 1983.111 By 1992, the dam was essentially
completed but for the resettlement. 1 12 Behind the dam is an area mea-
suring 19,000 hectares (73 miles) that has been flooded, forming the
dam's reservoir, which has displaced tens of thousands of people. The
dam is 808 metres [2,650 feet] long and has [a power house, which con-
tains] 20 turbines . ..
Yacyreti's infrastructure and its associated works are equally
held by Argentina and Paraguay. The entirety of the electricity pro-
duced, currently 2,100 Megawatts ("MGW"), is transmitted to and
utilized solely by Argentina. Paraguay in turn receives its half of the
production as royalty payments.1 1 4 The dam was designed to operate
Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, at 1 (Dec. 26, 1996). (All dollar figures or in U. S. dollar
equivalent).
110. "The Yacyreta dam's costs soared from an original estimate of $2.7 billion to $11.5
billion, and the still unfinished dam is currently 10 years behind schedule. It has faced
technical, financial, social and environmental problems." UK House of Commons, Select
Committee on International Development Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, Appendix
1, Recent Cases of Corruption involving UK Companies and UK Backed International
Financial Institutions: Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, Argentina, Itaipu Hydroelectric
Project, Brazil; UK Government Involvement -WORLD BANK (Prepared 5 April 2001),
available at http://www.parliament .the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm20000l/cmselect/
cmintdev /39/39ap06.htm. See also, Abid Aslam, World Bank Dam "Monument To
Corruption" ALBION MONITOR, Sept. 29, 1996. When the Yacyreta project started 16 years
ago, it was expected to cost around $2.6 billion. Recent estimates put the likely cost on
completion, slated for 1998, at between $11 billion and $12 billion. The new price tag makes
it the world's second most expensive dam, with the second highest cost overruns, after the
Itaipu dam just upstream," according to Glenn Switkes, Latin America program director of
the California-based International Rivers Network (IRN). Runaway project costs moved
Argentine President Carlos Menem to dub Yacyreta a "monument to corruption."
111. World Bank Inspection Panel, Investigation Report, Paraguay -Reform Project for
the Water and Telecommunications Sector (Loan No. 3842-PA); Argentina - SEGBA V Power
Distribution Project (Loan 2854-AR) (Feb. 24, 2004), at 9 27, available at http://
siteresources.worldbank. org/. . ./Resources/FulllnvestigationReport.pdf.
112. Id. at 22, 64. (Almost ten years later, in 1992, when the Bank reappraised the
project for a new loan in support of Yacyretd, 80 percent of the civil works had been
completed,").
113. RiverNet, European Rivers Network (undated), The Yacyreta Dam, http://
www.rivernet. org/southamerica/parana-basinlyacyreta.htm.
114. The World Bank, Projects & Operations, The Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project (2008),
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&piPK=73230&theSite
PK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P005937.
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with a water level of 83 meters above sea level ("masl"). However, it
has yet to operate with a water level higher than 76 masl.
Indeed, the YacyretA reservoir's floodgates were shuttered in
1994 before EBY could put into place a comprehensive environmental
and social mitigation plan. In addition, the reservoir has never been
filled to its full volume, and in 2001 the dam was operating at barely 60
percent of its installed capacity.115 This volume of water is below the
project's financial break-even point. Also, financing has yet to be lo-
cated for two pressing items: (1) the $857 million worth of additional
construction work required to fill the reservoir; and (2) for "past and
future resettlement and environmental mitigation costs."1 e
At its inception, the Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project was eco-
nomically justified on the unlikely assumption that Argentinean
electricity demand would increase by 8-10 percent per year during the
1980s.1 1 7 In reality, demand expanded by barely 2 percent.118 Thus, in
the mid-1990s, when the first Canadian GE turbines came on-line, Ar-
gentina already had an overabundance of generating capacity. A recent
World Bank's Performance Audit Report states that, "Based on the
foregoing, the Audit concludes that Yacyreta was not a least-cost solu-
tion to expanded power supply and its relevance to the country's
priorities was negligible. On several occasions, the Bank had good
cause for stopping the project before the major civil works were too
advanced."119
Finally, although the Project planned for the resettlement of a
total of 33,000 people, on both banks of the Parana River, i.e., on the
Argentine and Paraguayan sides, it has in fact displaced well over
50,000 people, as of 1997, and possibly as many as 80,000.120
115. UK House of Commons, supra note 111.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis supplied).
120. The figures vary between 50,000 and 80,000 people and at least 10,000 families.
See respectively, SOBREVIVENCIA, Amigos de la Tierra Paraguay, Request for Inspection,
Attachment to Letter addressed to Richard Bissell, Chairman, World Bank Inspection
Panel, dated September 12, 1996, at 3, 1 12 (displacement of "approximately 50,000 people);
UK House of Commons, supra note 111; Independent Investigative Mechanism Yacyretd
Hydroelectric Project, Report of the Review Panel, The Project and its Present Status, AT
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM, (Sept. 15, 1997) available at http://
www.iadb.org/cont/poli/yacyreta/statuse.htm. "Resettlement of more than 10,000 families
displaced by construction of the project"). For the 80,000 figure, see European Rivers
Network, The Yacyreta Dam, General Informations (Undated), http://www.rivernet.org/
southamericalparana basinlyacyreta.htm. (The "additional height [from 76 meters above
sea level to 83] of water would cover 500 extra square kilometers and affect the homes of
80,000 people.")
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V. DESPOILMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Both EBY and the Yacyretd Dam Project have prompted contro-
versy over the social and environmental impacts, as well as the
Project's economic viability, since construction began. Each Bank re-
ceived two separate requests for investigation. Moreover, in 1998 the
World Bank empanelled a "blue ribbon" team of experts 121 to investi-
gate raising the reservoir's water level from 76 masl to 83 masl.122
A. The First (1996) Request for Inspection
Two separate requests for inspection were simultaneously sub-
mitted to both Banks. The first was in 1996, while the second was
tendered in 2002. Both requests met the Inspection Panel's and the
IADB's Independent Inspection Mechanism's jurisdictional require-
ments. Thus, this subject will not be addressed in the ensuing
discussion. The reasons for the second request will be discussed below.
Complaints about the Yacyretd Project's impacts were submit-
ted jointly to the IBRD and the IADB. Procedurally, a complaint must
be submitted as a request where the effected parties feel that they
have exhausted their remedies with the Banks' staff and management.
This investigation turned out to be a precedent-setting event. Due to
the co-financing of Yacyreta by both IBRD and the IADB, two parallel
investigations were to be conducted. In order not to conduct duplica-
tive investigations, in May 1997, the IADB's board authorized its IIM
to cooperate with the IBRD's team.
The first request for inspection was filed on September 30,
1996, by an organization called "SOBEREVIVENCIA, Amigos de la-
Tierra Paraguay, a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting the
environment and the quality of life of indigenous, peasant and
marginalized urban communities living in poverty . . ."123 Sober-
121. The World Bank , Projects & Operations, World Bank Discusses Report Of
Advisory Panel On Yacyreta Hydro-Electric Project, Press Release No:2000/179/LAC (Jan.
1, 2000) available at http://go.worldbank.org/1ZO3HPLQYO. ("The World Bank has
presented the report of an international Blue-Ribbon Panel of Advisors commissioned to
study options for the future development of the Yacyretd hydroelectric project, on the
Parand River bordering Argentina and Paraguay").
122. Id. The independent, multidisciplinary Panel, composed of six experts from
Canada, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, and commissioned by the World
Bank in September 1998, analyzed the implications of operating the Yacyret6 dam with its
water reservoir at its current level of 76 meters above sea level and, alternatively, of raising
the water level and going to the originally-planned level of 83 meters above sea level.
123. Inspection Panel, Report and Recommendation, supra note 97, at 1.
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evivencia, is located in Asuncion, Paraguay, and filed the claim in its
own right and as a representative of persons who live in Encarncion,
Paraguay (hereinafter, the "requesters").1 2 4 The requesters claimed
that due to the IBRD's and IADB's policies, a series of grave effects
impaired the environment, as well as their standards of living, health
and economic well-being.12 5 They also alleged that many activities
that should have been completed prior to filling the reservoir were still
pending.
In addition, the requesters asserted that the two Banks failed to
ensure, via their supervision and enforcement of legal covenants, the
adequate implementation of environmental mitigation and resettle-
ment activities in the project area. 126 A full and exhaustive
recapitulation of the entire request is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, I will cover some of the more salient human rights and
environmental points, in order to provide the reader with a familiarity
of the extent of situation.
Soberevivencia alleged that the partial filling of the Yacyretd
reservoir, to 76 masl, "and violations of Bank policies"127 caused seri-
ous impacts to their standard of living, their economic well-being, and
their health.128 Indeed, the requesters alleged that the two Banks "vi-
olated policies on resettlement, adverse environmental assessment,
indigenous peoples, and wildlands."129 Moreover, these policies, they
maintained, also contributed to sanitary and socioeconomic impacts,
including that water leaked from the dam area and formed pools of
stagnant water which became polluted and bred disease. The claim-
ants also asserted that they suffered increased health problems caused
by poor water quality. The rising reservoir has introduced stagnant,
polluted water and has contaminated the groundwater supplies used
for drinking water. The rising water table has also incapacitated sani-
tation systems and destroyed crops. In addition, untreated sewage is
discharged into the lake and instead of being carried downstream it
stagnates in the proximity of homes now near the water level. The
municipal slaughterhouse, now on the shore of the reservoir, dis-
charges wastes directly into an arroyo used by local residents for
bathing and cooking water. Localized stagnant pools in the reservoir
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. See also, Bissel, supra note 22, at 742.
126. Id. See also, SOBEREVIVENCIA, Amigos de la Tierra Paraguay, Request for
Inspection (1996), at 1-2, available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/yacyretaenglish.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 2.
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have also caused concern regarding the presence of vectors for diseases
such as malaria, schistosomiasis and skin diseases. Among the health
impacts which have been registered, and which probably result from
the filling of the reservoir, are increased respiratory infections, diar-
rhea, skin rashes, skin and intestinal parasites, nutritional disorders,
and stress-related conditions. 130
That problem caused the contamination of groundwater sup-
plies used for drinking water. In addition, trash and other solid waste
triggered the discharge of untreated sewage into the pools [of] stagnant
water thereby creating health hazards; destroyed crops; "inundated
and destroyed island communities and ecosystems; displaced local peo-
ple and wildlife; constructed fish migration through dining the river,
dramatic impact on subsistence diets and biodiversity. . ."131
Indeed, prior to the flooding of the land, many of the individual
indigenous claimants -locally known as olerosl32 - earned their liveli-
hood by manufacturing bricks and ceramic tiles in a number of
locations where the clay was both unique and ideal for the fabrication
of these items.133 The resettlement plan left hundreds of these busi-
nesses and families with meager compensation that was of a derisory
amount. Moreover, these indigenous peoples found themselves with
inadequate resettlement housing and ancillary facilities, and pro-
longed economic hardship.
The requesters also alleged that employees of brick and ceramic
factories were not compensated for their loss of income. More egre-
gious, however, was the fact that EBY, along with the governments of
Argentina and Paraguay, employed club wielding police and military
units who both threatened to and beat those locals who either ques-
tioned or refused the resettlement offers or the process of being herded
into trucks and transported away. 134
130. Id. at 4. Schistosomiasis also called bilharzia is a tropical disease that may cause
serious, long-term illness in humans. It "is caused by parasitic flatworms ... The worms
live in fresh water in the tropics. To infect humans, the worms must first infect and mature
in freshwater snails, which are their 'intermediate hosts."' Directors of Health Promotion
and Education, Schistosomiasis (undated), http://www.dhpe.org/infect/schisto.html.
131. Id. 3, at 1.
132. See e.g., Julie Koppel Moldonado, Putting a Price-Tag on Humanity: Development-
Forced Displaced Communities' Fight for More Just Compensation, M.A. Thesis, American
University 42 (2008), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=mnd5CV1P2AcC
&pg=PA42&dq=oleros&hl=en&sa=X&ei=_28IT9OkFOTvOgGnyKWxAg&ved=OCEIQ6AEw
AA#v=onepage&q=oleros&f=false.
133. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 201.
134. See e.g., Marisancho Menj6n "Farewell to Paradise":Yacyretd Dam on the Parand
River - Argentina /Paraguay, UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARGOZA (undated) at 2, available at http://
www.unizar.es/aguariospueblos/pdf/caso/4._YacyretaFarewellToParadise Argentina
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Additionally, once these areas were inundated, the oleros did
not have access to similar quality clay materials. Furthermore, the
distances to resettlement areas from the requesters' former homes and
jobsites resulted in added economic losses due to the affected peoples'
remote locations and the relatively high cost of transportation. 1 3 5 This
loss of income and the high cost of transportation "forced many to with-
draw their children from school so that they c[ould] work to support
their families, with a resulting loss of educational opportunities and
hopes for future generations."1 3 6 Moreover, the separation from their
ancestral lands also caused the tearing of social networks and suffering
due to "separation from their families and friends."1 3 7
Due to the poorer quality of the clays in the new locales these
entrepreneurs also lost business and customers, causing them to lose
the higher standard of living that they previously enjoyed. 138 Other
adverse impacts included socioeconomic ones, such as the loss of jobs,
livelihood, and forced resettlement to smaller and lower quality
homes.' 39 Those involved in fishing also lost their resource base as
their former environment and habitat were made up of river fish.
Those fish suffocated due to a change in the water's oxygen levels,
caused by the reservoir that formed behind the dam. They also lost
their habitat due to the flooding of the land. Others, including bakers,
pastry makers and washerwomen, who were located in the area adja-
cent to the reservoir, also, "lost customers concerned over the effects of
lower water quality on the goods they produce and the services they
provide." 40
The requesters also asserted that the direct and material ad-
verse effects described above resulted from the IBRD's omissions and
paraguay.pdf. (Eye-witness testimonies and videos show violent evictions of communities by
paramilitary gangs, including the burning down of houses; the flooding of farms and homes
due to the raising of the water level without prior notice; and the callous treatment of
thousands of families who have been forced to live in settlements lacking fertile soil, access
to fish, or fresh drinking water). Id. See also, The Center for International Environmental
Law, Singrauli and Yacyreta Update (May 13, 1998), http://www.ciel.org/
IntlFinancial Inst/pryacsin.html (recently, local non-violent protesters were brutally
beaten by private security forces (hired by EBY) wielding lead pipes, sending 22 people to
the hospital. 3,000 people had gathered to protest EBYs failure to mitigate the suffering
from frequent flooding. Given the recent use of violence against protesters, it is chilling that
the Bank is calling for greater use of security without informing the Board of the true
situation on the ground).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Soberevivencia, Request for Inspection, supra note 126, at 1.
138. HUNTER, supra note 22, at 201.
139. See SOBREVIVENCIA, supra note 126, at 11.
140. Id.
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failures in the preparation and implementation of the Project. These
lapses and failures, they asserted, violated the Bank's policies and pro-
cedures.141 Furthermore, these omissions and failures included inter
alia, "Environmental Aspects of Bank Work, Operational Manual
Statement ("OMS" 2.36); Environmental Policy for Dam and Reservoir
Projects, Operational Directive ("OD" 4.00 Annex B);142 Environmental
Assessment (OD 4.01); Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.02); Involuntary Re-
settlement (OD 4.30); Project Monitoring and Evaluation (OD 10.70)
... Project Supervision (OD 13.05); [and] Suspension of Disbursements
(OD 13.40)."143
In addition, SOBREVIVENCIA claimed that procedural aspects
incorporated into many of the Bank's policies, including basic rights of
participation and access to information, were denied to the requesters
or ignored in the preparation and execution of the Yacyretd Project.
These included claims that an environmental trust fund was required
pursuant to one of the loans (Loan 3520-AR), "with proceeds from the
sale of electricity to fund environmental mitigation and resettle-
ment",144 was neither established nor properly funded. Other claims
included the Bank's lax supervision of the project and the bank's fail-
ure to enforce its rights under several agreements with the
governments of Argentina, Paraguay and the EBY.
B. The Inspection Panel's Report
The Inspection Panel found that indeed the IBRD's manage-
ment ignored the bank's regulations and procedures. When the Panel
received its first application for inspection in 1996, it was asked by the
requesters to investigate what was claimed to be the "incalculable
harm which would result as a consequence of raising the Yacyretd res-
ervoir's water level to 76 masl." Following its initial review, the Panel
recommended to the IBRD's Board that an investigation be under-
taken. However, at a meeting conducted in February 1997 the Board
rejected the investigation recommendation. Thus, the IP's indepen-
dent judgment was stymied by the board.
Rather, the Board, following management's presentation of two
Action Plans (Plan A and Plan B) to deal with the Project's outstanding
problems, asked the Panel to investigate the efficacy of the two plans.
Plan A provided for concluding the resettlement of the project-affected
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 26.
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people, as well as the required environmental action plan that was
never put into action prior to the increase of the reservoir's water level
to 76 masl. On the other hand, Plan B sought to deal with a number of
discreet problems, which arose as a consequence of holding the reser-
voir's water level at 76 masl.
The Panel issued its report on these matters on September 16,
1997. In its findings, it initially observed that
The YacyretA hydroelectric Project was conceived and designed over
twenty five years ago under very different circumstances and stan-
dards from those of today, in particular with respect to environment
and resettlement. The selection of the site locked the project into a
series of inevitable and irreversible impacts, including flooding of
over 100,000 hectares and affecting over 50,000 people in two major
urban areas. Today, there are considerably stricter environmental
and resettlement standards, as well as a much deeper appreciation
of the social costs and difficulties to communities posed by involun-
tary resettlement of large numbers of people. Nevertheless,
integrated watershed modeling of the Parana River Basin could
have exposed alternative generation sites with potentially lower
impacts. 145
The Inspection Panel also found that since construction began
in 1983, even with numerous delays, there was an imbalance between
the civil and electro-mechanical works, i.e., the building of the dam,
which was 99.8% complete, and the "complementary works", i.e., the
environmental and resettlement plans, which the Panel found were
less than a third complete.146 Indeed, this disparity, the IP observed,
was "one of the fundamental problems of the Yacyretd Project."147
Moreover, this imbalance was exacerbated by the usual Bank practice
of financing the former while leaving the latter for counterpart fund-
ing. Similarly, the Panel established that the project experienced
significant "environmental and social liabilities that are causing in-
creasing friction with affected populations which could have been
foreseen and avoided." 1 4 8
The Panel also found that two events led to SOBREVI-
VENCIA's request. The first was the raising or filling of the reservoir
to 76 masl in September 1994.149 This incident began prior to EBY,
Argentina, and Paraguay completing the agreed upon requirements vis
145. The Inspection Panel, supra note 97Review of Problems and Assessment of Action
Plans: Argentina /Project, Sept. 16, 1997, at $ 252. (Emphasis added).
146. Id. at 1 255.
147. Id. at T 253.
148. Id.
149. Id. at T 254.
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a vis the resettlement and environmental issues contracted for and de-
manded by the Bank's policies.1o50 The second event resulted from
Argentina's economic collapse. Both the IBRD and the IADB jointly
executed a "no-objection" to raising the water level to 76 masl, appar-
ently based on the belief "that no irreversible damage would take place
and that completion of remaining actions was proceeding satisfacto-
rily."151 Nevertheless, soon after the reservoir was filled, economic
conditions triggered Argentina's freezing financial support for the Ya-
cyretA enterprise, leading to a two year shutdown of the project. 152
Another of the Panel's findings was that, as a result of the long-
term operation of the dam at a reservoir level of 76 masl, the ground-
water level rose and flooded low lying areas in yet-to-be resettled
villages. 153 This link between EBY raising the reservoir level and the
concomitant flooding although unintended by EBY, according to the IP,
was certainly foreseen and predictable. 154 Indeed, the Panel reported
that the two plans proposed by the Bank's management to correct this
condition, "including both actions required prior to filling the reservoir
(Plan A) and those required due to prolonged operation at this eleva-
tion (Plan B)"1 55 implicitly recognized that both the environmental and
resettlement covenants were out of compliance.156
The Panel also found that there were other examples of non-
compliance. These included: (1) a complete absence of required
hydrogeological studies or monitoring of the impact of the reservoir on
lands and soils; (2) problems regarding the creation and management
of a compensation reserve; (3) no external review of plans for environ-
mental management; and (4) a two year lingering failure in selecting
an environmental coordinator.157 The IP also established that in 1992,
when the Bank instituted its new operational directives on Environ-
mental and Resettlement procedures, it made "considerable efforts to
bring the project into compliance with the relevant ODs and intro-
duced important changes in the design."158
Nevertheless, these endeavors, according to the Panel, were
met by EBY's institutional resistance. 159 Moreover, the IP noted, it
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1 256.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1 257. (the operational directives included OD 4.01 and OD 4.30).
159. Id.
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was extremely difficult to get EBY to make progress on these issues,
predominantly due to its bureaucratic problems and lack of financial
resources.160 Of course, an obvious question is, what did EBY's offi-
cials do with the money that was allotted to them for this phase the
project? Indeed, one would expect the IBRD to account for every penny
of the funds that it either loaned or granted to Argentina, Paraguay
and EBY, but apparently the IBRD did not.' 6'
Finally, the Panel stressed that "[tlimely completion of both
Plans A and B are the first critical steps in this process, but they do not
represent all the actions that are required. For example: 162
(1) Unsanitary circumstance abound, due to numerous bodies
of stagnant water formed by the reservoir, in each of the
cities adjacent to the reservoir, including the large munici-
palities of Encarnaci6n, Carmen del Parana in Paraguay,
and Posadas in Argentina. These conditions are caused by a
dearth of sewage treatment plants. 63
(2) Accordingly, such conditions pose health risks to the indi-
gent people who reside in low-lying urban areas. 164
(3) It will take several years to organize and employ solutions
which would effectively resolve some of these problems.16 5
(4) The IADB and IBRD loans require the construction of both
sewage and wastewater treatment plants for the cities En-
carnaci6n and Posadas. However, in 1997, the IP found that
it would take at least three years before these facilities can
be operational. The Panel recommended that the construc-
tion process be closely monitored. 6 6
C. The Inter-American Development Bank's ("IADB") Independent
Investigative Mechanism
The IADB's Inspection Panel, formally known as the Indepen-
dent Investigative Mechanism ("IIM"), also found numerous problems
with the Yacyretd Project. In the "General Problems" section of its
September 1997 report, the IIM observed that "[t]his situation is espe-
cially evident in the management of EBY, with the result that the
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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spirit and letter of the 1973 Treaty are not really observed in prac-
tice." 6 7 Furthermore, the IIM noted that a number of the IADB's
documents demonstrated that the "project is plagued by serious
problems that are caused by failures to adhere to the established timeta-
bles and commitments for completion of the principal work."16 8 This
lethargic execution of the project is clearly demonstrated by the IADB's
extremely lengthy delays in taking steps to enforce its own rules.
These measures were specifically put into place to mitigate the envi-
ronmental impacts, particularly those of the complementary works.169
In this regard, the IIM found that:
(1) the first environmental impact assessment (which it called
a "study") was undertaken in 1992 pursuant to an initiative
of the World Bank.
(2) This was fully twenty years following the Dam's feasibility
study, and some ten years following the initiation of the
dam's construction.1 7 0
(3) Indeed, the IIM observed that "[i]t cannot be argued that
there was no well-developed and general professional un-
derstanding of the social and environmental aspects of
major dams in 1983, when the construction of this dam was
begun.171
The latter observation is critical, and points to continuing
lapses by the two Banks' management teams in adhering to their own
environmental policies. Specifically, the management teams ignored
the World Bank's Operational Policy/Bank Procedures - OP/BP 4.01,
which addresses Environmental Assessments. The IBRD defines the
term "environmental impact assessment" ("EIA") as a mechanism em-
ployed in order to identify and assess potential environmental effects of
a proposed development plan, which evaluates suitable mitigation,
management, and measures to monitor risks and benefits.172
Given the IIM's discussion about the lack of pre-construction
environmental impact assessments, I will now address the subject
167. Inter-American Development Bank, Yacyret& Hydroelectric Project, Report of the
Review Panel, General Problems (Sept. 15, 1997), available at http://www.iadb.org/cont/polil
yacyreta/problems.htm.
168. Id. (specifying delays in execution).
169. Id.
170. Id. ("Thus the Master Environmental Management Plan and the Plan of Action for
Resettlement and Rehabilitation were not set in motion until 20 years after the feasibility
study of the project and almost 10 years after commencement of the civil works").
171. Id.
172. The World Bank, Operational Manual, OP 4.01, Annex A - Definitions (Jan. 1999),
available at http://go.worldbank.orgK7F3DCUDDO.
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more substantially with a focus on the Yacyretd Project, as well as the
IBRD and the IADB.
VI. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT INDUSTRY
"Our experience with environmental impact assessment is
that when you put the major environmental impacts, the likelihood
is that you will get major environmental impacts. The only problem
is, you don't ever get quite the impacts you expect . 173
A. Background
Pursuant to its Operational Directive 4.01, the World Bank re-
quires that environmental impact assessments ("ElAs") be conducted
for each and every project proposed for Bank financing. This prerequi-
site to financing is in place to ensure that projects are both sustainable
and environmentally sound, and are to be employed in aid of decision
making. The EIA evaluates risks versus benefits over a cross-section
of various criteria, including environmental concerns, project effective-
ness, and impact on people, among others. But why conduct an EIA
generally, and why undertake one for the Yacyretd Hydroelectric
Project?
The process of investigating man's impact on the environment
began in 1969, when the United States Congress enacted, and Presi-
dent Nixon signed into law, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ("NEPA").174 NEPA's purpose as enunciated by Congress is to
declare a national policy which will encourage productive and en-
joyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to en-
rich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural
resources important to the Nation .... 175
NEPA is the corner stone of environmental policy making in the
United States. It became the gold standard for other nations and orga-
nizations, many of whom have adopted its sweeping breadth. The Act's
procedures are designed to ensure that agencies of the federal govern-
173. See PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RivERs: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE
DAMs 54. (2001) (citing Professor Frank Grad, Columbia University Law School, 1992).
174. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. §4321
(1970).42 U.S.C. §§ 4321.
175. Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). See also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 - 349
(1979).
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ment employ environmental assessment as a key tool in making
informed decisions based on an understanding of the consequences of
their actions on the environment. With this knowledge in hand, federal
agencies use it to pursue processes that protect, restore, and enhance
the environment.1 7 6 To advance this end, NEPA requires federal agen-
cies to draft an environmental impact statement (EIS) for any "major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."17 7
NEPA also gave birth to the process known as an environmental
impact assessment, by requiring the assessment prior to the initiation
of any federal project, such as the construction of a dam or other large
infrastructure projects.178 The impact on the environment must be-
come part of the weighing and balancing of the project's viability.
Thus, an environmental assessment ("EA") should: (1) identify all di-
rect and long-term adverse impacts; (2) allow the decision maker to
determine: (a) whether the Proposed Action should be regarded as a
"Major Action"; (b) whether the environmental impact is significant;
and (c) whether the action could be environmentally controversial.
In addition, NEPA established such a far reaching precedent
that numerous countries and international development agencies have
adopted its sweeping goals, and have insisted on written EIAs prior to
the initiation of any major infrastructure projects. 179
176. Id. at 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1970) (part b of section 101 of the Act provides: "In order to
carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of
national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources to the end that the Nation may - 1.fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; 2.assure for all Americans safe,
healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 3.attain the
widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or
safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; and 4.enhance the quality of
renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources").
177. Id. at 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1970) (part C of section 102 of the Act provides: "All
agencies of the Federal Government shall include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the
environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,(iii) alternatives to the proposed
action,(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented."
178. Ellen M. Erhardt, Caution Ahead: Changing Laws to Accommodate Public-Private
Partnerships in Transportation, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 905, 923 (2008).
179. See McCULLY, supra note 176, at 54.
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A thorough assessment of a proposed dam's possible environmental
impacts should indeed be required before any project moves for-
ward. Regrettably, foreign governments, multi-development banks
and dam builders have invariably turned the EIA process into a
bureaucratic formality, merely another regulatory hurdle, which de-
velopers must jump, before they can get their project approved.180
Furthermore, foreign governments and development agencies
such as the IBRD and IADB, seldom regard EIAs as "objective studies
[to be employed in order] to inform an open debate on whether or not a
project is desirable, but instead employ them as rubber stamps for
projects they have already decided to build."18 1 But why do the Banks
not take environmental assessments seriously, or at least as seriously
as they should? There are three answers to this question.
The first and most significant answer is that the Banks - as
well as other funders - know that, due to pressure to reform their pro-
cedures, they must employ EIAs. But the rub is that the Banks control
the EIA process from beginning to end. The reason for the foregoing is
quite simple: because international environmental consulting has be-
come a huge and competitive business - and there are only a small
handful of these businesses182 - consultants are therefore willing to
bend to their principles' wishes and alter reports on demand, because
they want the job for the next project. One reason for this lack of inde-
pendence is that the international consultancies "have a strong self-
interest in underplaying the environmental impacts of projects and ex-
aggerating their benefits." 8 3 If their conclusions are not favorable to
the Banks or the dam builders, then the likelihood that they will get
future contracts will be greatly diminished.184 For example, "the
World Bank's guidelines on environmental assessment specify that
consultants must be 'acceptable to both the World Bank and the local
contracting agencies."'
85
There exists an obvious conflict of interest, or a quid quo pro,
"when the company assessing the environmental viability of a project
180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 54-55 ("The environmental assessments for large internationally funded dam
projects are invariably written by consultants from a relatively small number of companies,
some of which, such as German consultants Lahmeyer International, are also directly
involved in dam building. Others, such as Norwegian firm Norconsult, are subsidiaries of
dam builders.")
183. Id. at 55.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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is also likely to get the contract to build it."186 In addition, when sec-
tions of an EIA are critical of the project or highlight concerns "that
some effects cannot be predicted, these points are invariably toned
down in the report's overall conclusions (and criticisms in drafts fre-
quently disappear when they appear in final form)."187 One example of
this phenomenon is a case regarding the construction of a dam on the
Mekong River. In that case, Acres International, a Canadian environ-
mental consultant, and a French dam builder, stated in their EIA that
the "environmental impacts of the proposed dams are expected to be
... not severe."188  However, a fisheries study conducted by a U.S.
company warned of a wholesale decline of fisheries if the dam was
constructed.
The second reason is that there is no quality control of the con-
sultants' EIA reports. They are not peer reviewed, there are no in-
house reviews at the Banks, and there is no public input. Moreover,
"they are often treated as state or commercial secrets and hidden from
public scrutiny"189 even though the monies that the Banks use to pay
for these studies are taxpayer funds from member states.
Alternatively, NEPA requires agencies to provide public notice
of their EIS' by publishing them in the Federal Register, the Govern-
ment's daily publication, and to allow the public the opportunity to
comment. 190 The agency must then weigh the comments and respond
to them prior to making its decision. Additionally, the public has the
right to sue the agency if they feel that the agency acted in an arbitrary
or capricious manner in arriving at its final evaluation.191
The final reason has more to do with the Banks themselves.
Their mission is to lend money. This fact drives how things work at all
186. Id. (Citing critiques of an EIA involving the German company Lahmeyer, in
"Reappraisal of the Adequacy of the EIA Report for the Nem Leuk Hydropower Project,
Conclusions of a Consultancy Report to the Protected Areas and Watershed Management
Division of the Ministry of Forestry, Lao PDR" (Nov. 16, 1994); and an EIA of Norconsult by
A.D. Usher and G. Ryder, Vattenfall Abroad: Damming the Theun River, (in ANN DANAYIA
USHER, DAMS As AID: A POLITICAL ANATOMY OF NORDIC DEVELOPMENT THINKING (1997)).
187. MCCULLY, supra note 176, at 55.
188. Id. (Citing CNR. Lyon/Acres International, Calgary/Mekong Secretariat, Mekong
Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower: Main Report 18 (Bangkok, Dec. 1994)).
189. Id.
190. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(i) (2009) (provides in pertinent part that "[sluch
schedule shall conform to the guidelines which shall be promulgated, pursuant to notice and
receipt of public comment, by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and
which shall provide for a uniform schedule of fees for all agencies."). (emphasis added).
191. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
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of the MDBs, including the IBRD and IADB. Indeed, a former IBRD
vice-president observed in a report leaked to the public that there is a
pervasive "culture of approval" at the Bank.
Entrenched in this ethos is a mindset that provides incentives
to employees and encourages them to move money out the door as
quickly as possible, "without adequate attention to project quality or
mitigation of the social and environmental impacts of projects."192 A
thorough search produces no evidence, including in the two Banks' An-
nual Reports or on their websites, that the Banks have rejected out of
hand even a single project because it was not practical, too expensive
or badly planned. However, the real human rights and environmental
tragedy that one sees from the evidence underlying this entire process
is that management and staff at these two MDBs appears not to care
about what takes place on the ground, in spite of all of their policies
and operational directives, and miss a golden opportunity for aiding
project-affected people.
B. The Bank's Response to the EIA Farce
How does the IBRD respond to the above? It does not. Rather,
it maintains that its "safeguard system", which includes environmen-
tal assessments, "is an essential tool for integrating environmental and
social concerns into development policies, programs and projects by
providing minimum requirements that all Bank-supported operations
meet."193 This statement, as far as the author in concerned, is devoid
of any meaning and is typical bureaucratic babble. Moreover, the
IBRD maintains that its safeguard policies are the "cornerstone of its
support to sustainable poverty reduction."194 It also asserts that the
objective of these policies is to halt and assuage unnecessary injury to
project-affected people and their environment during the course of de-
velopment. Finally, according to the Bank, these policies set
procedures for the borrower country as well as for the Bank's staff dur-
ing the project's preparation and implementation. The findings of the
IP and the IIM however belie these claims.
Indeed, the Bank asserts that these policies allow its staff to
"operationalize [ I the 'do no harm' approach to [its] lending and are
192. See Clark, supra note 19, at 217.
193. The World Bank, Environmental Assessment (2008) http://go.worldbank.org/
TOZC4H9SMO.
194. The World Bank, Safeguard Policies (2008), http://go.worldbank.org/
WTA10DE7TO.
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fundamental in meeting the three pillars of the World Bank Environ-
ment Strategy:
* Improving the quality of life
* Improving the quality of growth
* Protecting the quality of the regional and global
commons "195
The preceding discussion notwithstanding, one of the reques-
ters' 1996 claims is that that the Bank violated its own policies on
environmental assessment by filling the reservoir to 76 masl without
an EIA. Bank management denied this claim, asserting that "even if
there has been harm, it is not the result of any policies." 196 Indeed it
denied every claim that the requesters made. Nevertheless, the In-
spection Panel agreed with the claimants' charges noting that the
"Panel observes that .. . Environmental policies require an appropriate
sequence of actions to prevent harm . . . [However, the] sequence of
actions in this Project . . . was allowed to slip badly . . ."197
Moreover, as is discussed below, in its second Report, dated
February 24, 2004, the IBRD's Inspection Panel also found that for
specific resettlement sites, documents presented as environmental as-
sessments were "very inadequate and [did] not comply with OD
4.01."198 Additionally, the scope of environmental issues detailed is
quite limited; unlike NEPA's requirements there are no alternatives to
the resettlement options presented, and mitigation measures are sim-
ply not discussed. Furthermore, the affected parties were neither
consulted nor even approached.
C. The Independent Inspection Mechanism's Findings Square With
Those of the Inspection Panel's
Concomitantly, the IADB's IIM also found that, in this regard,
the very first environmental impact assessment (which it called a
"study") was undertaken in 1992 by an initiative of the IBRD, twenty
years following the Dam's feasibility study, and some ten years follow-
195. Lex Brown, An Adaptive Approach to Strategic Environmental Assessment, (Dec.
23, 2002), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/BSPAN/PresentationView.asp?PID=172
&EID=84
196. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inspection Panel, Report
and Recommendation of the Inspection Panel, Request for Inspection, Argentina /Paraguay
Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, 25 at 6 (Dec. 26, 1996), available at http://www.wds.world
bank.org.
197. Id. at 26.
198. See Paraguay - Reform Project, supra note 114, at 128 in Annex A: Table of
Findings, at Preparation of Environmental Assessments.
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ing the initiation of the dam's construction. Consequently, the IIM
stressed that the IADB's Master Environmental Management Plan
and its Plan of Action for Resettlement and Rehabilitation were set in
motion 20 years following the Yacyreti's feasibility study and some 10
years subsequent to the "commencement of the civil works." "Further-
more, having taken measures to mitigate the social and environmental
effects of the reservoir before it was filled in 1994, fresh circumstances
arose immediately afterward that caused further delays in
execution."199
However, once the filling of the reservoir was underway a ca-
lamity of Noahian proportions took place; the flood of water that
covered the inundated land caused an enormous number of animals to
drown. Despite the Bank's decades-long knowledge that such efforts at
salvaging a handful of animals are at best minimal, and the associated
voluble, frequent and recurring criticism of these practices from wild-
life conservationists, EBY continued with this practice. 200 But in order
to alleviate public concern over this mass drowning - as is the case in
most World Bank dam operations - EBY planned a highly publicized
and televised rescue operation. Why is this practice continued? Wil-
liam Partridge, a senior World Bank environmental employee, has
contemptuously remarked with regards to the rescue effort at Ya-
cyretd, that "the rescue of individual animals makes good
television."201
The IIM also noted the intermittent execution of the project. It
went so far as to state that this "is a feature that shows up in each of
the components of the complementary works, as in, among other com-
ponents, the resettlement program . . . the compensatory nature
reserves program, the program for the treatment of sewage in the two
towns, and the cleanup of the reservoir's banks." Of course, these de-
lays cause the project-affected people's suffering to continue unabated
while EBY considers how it will progress.
Furthermore, the IIM reported that there was no public partici-
pation in any phase of the project. The members described the
situation as follows, "[in a project as large and complex as Yacyretd,
consensus-building participation by the local population is of critical
199. Inter-American Development Bank, Independent Investigative Mechanism,
Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project: Report of the Review Panel (Sept. 15, 1997), at DELAYS IN
EXECUTION, http://www.iadb.org/cont/poli/yacyreta/problems.htm.
200. McCULLY, supra note 176, at 54 (Other dam builders, apparently with World Bank
and IADB approval, continue to persist in undertaking these vile practices).
201. Comment made during an interview for The Dammed, the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation television documentary, broadcast Feb. 17, 1995, cited in, McCuLLY, Silenced
Rivers, supra note 176 at 54.
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importance to generate tangible benefits for that population."202 How-
ever, the IIM members also noted that due to a complete lack of social
and environmental evaluation and planning prior to EBY's launching
of the actual work, circumstances dictated how the social and environ-
mental programs would be executed. 203 These haphazard conditions,
according to IIM, stalled any meaningful or authentic involvement by
the local populations - both in Argentina and Paraguay - in conceiving
the programs and policies that they would have to live with.204
Similarly, the IIM's members noted, that only recently has the
notion of citizen participation and project ownership been instituted
into the course of action of the two banks and the two countries. 205 The
Mechanism's members speculated that EBY may be taking its cue from
these four entities. 206 Additionally, the members observed that this
may be why EBY persisted in not adopting the machinery and mea-
sures for enhancing coordination and dialogue with the local
populations.207
Finally, the IIM asserted a number of other points. First "[i]t
has to be understood that genuine participation requires specific poli-
cies that create conditions for dialogue."208 Second, over the years,
EBY failed to respond in a systematic manner to the local population's
demands and complaints, specifically regarding resettlement issues.
Indeed, as of 1997 - and as will be demonstrated below, through 2004 -
EBY did not offer full compensation for homes and businesses. Third,
the fact that EBY still requires in excess of $700 million in loans for its
resettlement program is a testament to EBY's failure to truly deal with
the situation, let alone to engage in real consultation and participation.
Fourth, in their 1997 report, the Mechanism's members noted that
EBY's pro forma responses are bereft of legitimacy in the eyes of the
local populations. The essential requirement for meaningful participa-
tion, the IIM emphasized, requires transparency in action and in
policy, as well as ready access to information. This has yet to occur.
202. Independent Investigative Mechanism, Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project, supra note
202.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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VII. D1gJA Vu) ALL OVER AGAIN: THE 2002 REQUEST FOR INSPECTION
AND THE 2004 REPORT
The status quo lingered since the issuance of the IP's and IIM's
reports in 1997. Then, on May 17, 2002, the IBRD's Inspection Panel
received a Request for Inspection from the Federaci6n de Afectados por
Yacyretd de Itapua y Misiones (FEDAYIM), a Paraguayan NGO. The
request was filed on behalf of more than 4,000 family communities in
Paraguay, alleging that the Bank had violated its own policies and pro-
cedures regarding the design and implementation of the Yacyretd
Hydroelectric Project. The requesters asserted that both their lives
and their environment would be gravely harmed by the Project. In ad-
dition, "Six coordinators of affected people in the San Cosme y Damian,
Distrito Cambyreta, Barrio Pacu Cdla, Barrio Santa Rosa Mboy Cad,
Arroyo Potiy, and Barrio Santa Rosa areas of Paraguay also signed the
Request."209
Once again, the requesters asserted that by raising the Ya-
cyretA reservoir to 76 meters above sea level (masl), EBY caused them
serious environmental harm, including persistent flooding of munici-
pal creeks, "a higher water table, and the spreading of disease, which
has forced them to live in unbearable conditions."210 They also claimed
that a "proposed wastewater treatment plant, to be built under the
Project, would further pollute the environment because its location and
design are based on a defective environmental assessment and [were]
in violation of national environmental laws."211 Moreover, FEDAYIM
asserted that EBY's resettlement and compensation plans were not be-
ing faithfully put into action. 212 The requesters similarly complained
that families impacted by the reservoir's elevation were not suitably
identified. Likewise, they alleged that EBY's resettlement and com-
pensation program left hundreds of affected families and businesses
with deficient or no compensation, feeble resettlement housing and fa-
cilities, as well as lingering economic privation.213 As with the
previous submission, the requesters charged that "employees of brick
209. See, Investigation Report Paraguay - Reform Project for the Water and
Telecommunications Sector (Loan No. 3842-PA); Argentina - SEGBA V Power Distribution
Project (Loan 2854-AR), ix (Feb. 24, 2004), siteresources.worldbank.org/. . ./Resources/Full
InvestigationReport.pdf.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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and ceramic factories [the oleros] have not been compensated for their
loss of income."2 14
FEDAYIM also asserted that the Project did not sufficiently
consider a range of optional resettlement sites. 2 1 5 Once again, the re-
questers asserted, and the IP found, that the IBRD's management
failed to ensure that substitute sites were considered in the environ-
mental assessment for the resettlement areas. That failure was in
violation of OD 4.30. Similarly, the Panel found that the Bank's man-
agement failed in its efforts in restoring the earning capacity of the
people who were resettled. For example, numerous displaced people
were relocated far from their products' markets and services. Moreo-
ver, others had problems both with the cost, delays and problems, with
traveling to their places of work. Indeed, the IP found that the reset-
tlement area suffered from an economic crisis, and that the EA should
have found alternative resettlement sites.216
OD 4.30 requires that all project-affected people, who, due to
the construction and development of a project, lose their sources of in-
come as a consequence of a "Bank-financed project be compensated for
their losses even in cases where they have not been physically dis-
placed." 217 The Panel noted that in its 1997 report, regarding the
Yacyreti project, it recommended to the Bank's Directors and manage-
ment that they should ensure that the affected workers, who, due to
the elevation of the height of the reservoir, lost their jobs and liveli-
hoods, be compensated as required by Bank policy. 2 18 At that time the
Panel wrote:
It is a fact that clay deposits of the quality and amount of the depos-
its lost because of the reservoir elevation have not been found.. . and
therefore it is difficult to accept that the workers lost their jobs be-
cause of a simple decision of owners of olerias to change economic
activities. There seems to be enough prima facie evidence that the
loss of jobs by brick factory workers has been caused mainly-if not
directly-by the filling of the reservoir. If this is the case, the workers
should be compensated according to Bank policy.2 19
214. Id.
215. Inter-American Development Bank, Final Report Of the Panel of the Independent
Investigation Mechanism On Yacyretd Hydroelectric Project 760/OC-RG (Feb. 27, 2004), at
9 ("It is important to seek mechanisms which ensure the inclusion of the real interests of
the affected population in the design and implementation of resettlement plans."),
www.iadb.org/iimprl9l7l3eng.pdf
216. Id.
217. Id. at xx.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 92, 303.(Emphasis in original). (Citing 1997 Panel Assessment).
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This recommendation however was not followed.
With regards to the compensation of the resettled workers of
brick and tile-making industries - commonly called oleros - the Panel
found that the owners of medium-to-large industries or businesses
were fully compensated. 220 The workers, however, were not. First,
under Paraguayan law, the employers, not EBY, were required to pro-
vide a severance package. The problem with this compensation
scheme, the Panel found, was that not every worker worked on the
books or had her social security registered. Accordingly, these workers
were not fully compensated. Similarly, with regards to the "small
brick" manufacturers, they were generally self-employed. The latter,
the poorest workers and those with incomplete documentation were
not fully compensated.
Moreover, the Panel found that the Bank's management offered
four compensation schemes. One of these options was to offer the
oleros private plots, which in and of themselves, did not have any clay.
Therefore, EBY was to arrange for a five-year supply of clay from other
sources. Indeed, this option was embraced for one of the relocation
sites, the San Pedro resettlement site. The Panel visited the San Pedro
site and found that although some families reestablished their brick-
making efforts, many of them continued to protest their lost income
and a lack of sustained access to the clay raw materials, since the five-
year clay supply had ended. 221 Other resettlement issues also re-
mained unresolved since the Panel's 1997 report.
As can be seen over the course of more than a decade, the
IBRD's Inspection Panel found that resettlement issues were raised
several times with both EBY and the bank without any resolution.
This is evidenced by the many formal complaints filed over that time
period by indigenous peoples who lived within the area that encom-
passed the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project. The IADB's Inspection
Mechanism made similar findings. There is no question that these in-
sults to the project-affected people violate their human rights,
including (1) their right to human dignity; (2) their right to earn a liv-
220. Id. at 93, 305 (The issue of compensating medium and large industry owners, as
distinct from artisanal brick- and tile-makers, was the subject of a meeting of EBY's
Executive Directors on June 9, 1994. This meeting approved the "Policy Declaration for
Encarnaci6n" which offered solutions to compensate brick and tile industry owners on the
Paraguayan side of the river. Priority was to be given to compensating the most vulnerable
families-identified as mostly artisanal brickmakers- either through resettlement in areas
above 84 masl or through assistance in changing their means of employment.).
221. Id. at xxi. ("However, the Panel expresseld] concerns about the adequacy of
providing only a five year supply of clay, as this appears to be a temporary mitigation
measure rather than a solution that would allow the activity to continue in the long-term.")
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ing; (3) live in adequate housing; and (4) have a safe and healthful
environment, among other abuses.
Following its receipt of the second request and management's
rejoinder, the Inspection Panel traveled to the affected area and urged
the Board of Executive Directors to permit an inspection to go forward.
This request was approved on September 9, 2002, approximately four
months following receipt of FEDAYIM's request.222 The Panel found
the following policies and procedures to be relevant to the request: "En-
vironmental Assessment OD 4.01 (October 1991);223 Involuntary
Resettlement OD 4.30 (June 1990); Project Supervision OD/OP/BP
13.05 (March 1989 and July 2001);224 [and] Monitoring and Evaluation
OD 10.70 (November 1989)."225
As with the 1996 request, this Panel also found that the Bank
violated a number of its directives and policies. 226 For example, OD
4.01 "requires that environmental assessments be prepared for the re-
settlement activities financed by the Bank."227 With regards to that
directive, the Panel found that initially management did not provide
an environmental assessment (EA). However, in November of 2003,
management presented environmental assessments (EA) produced by
consultants to EBY. These EAs were said to be able to demonstrate
EBY's compliance with Bank's requirements. 228 The Panel found that
the EAs were prepared for the resettlement of three primary sites, Ar-
royo Pord, Carmen del Parand, and Ita Paso.229
After its review, the IP found that the Assessments were "very
inadequate"230 and did not comply with the requirements of OD 4.01.
The range of environmental matters addressed was limited. For exam-
222. Id. at ix.
223. OD stands for Operational Directive. See e.g., World Bank Group, Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG), Implementation of Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous
Peoples: An evaluation of Results (Phase 2) (2011), http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/oed/
oeddoclib.nsf/ InterLandingPagesByUNID/ACEE14F0E07CD8F385256DOB0073946A.
224. OP stands for Operational Policy. See e.g., World Bank Group, Operational
Manual, OP 4.11 - Physical Cultural Resources (July 2006), http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAIL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:2097
0737-menuPK:4564185-pagePK:64709096-piPK:64709108-theSitePK:502184isCURL.
World Bank Group, Operational Manual, BP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment (Revised
May 2011), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/
EXTOPMANUAJ0,,contentMDK:20064614-menuPK:64701637-pagePK:64709096-piPK:
64709108-theSitePK:502184,00.htmI
225. Final Report Of the Panel of the Independent Investigation, supra note 218, at xi.
226. Id. at xii.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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ple, there was no consideration of alternative resettlement sites, and
EBY's consultants suggested few mitigation measures.23 1 Moreover,
the affected parties were not consulted. 23 2 Accordingly, the Panel con-
cluded that the protections built into OD 4.01 were disregarded. 233
Furthermore, the IP found that the Yacyretd Project's future
environmental management was seriously threatened by financial is-
sues and therefore, both the "natural environment and project-affected
people will suffer additional harm if the project's environmental man-
agement practices deteriorate." 23 4  The Panel also considered the
urban and peri-urban 235 environments, and found that an EA prepared
for a Second Yacyretd Project, 2 3 6 was insufficient in a number of ways
in its deliberations of these environments. In addition, the EA failed to
adequately take into account the impacts of increased population on
the city of Encarnaci6n, or the impacts of "the resettlement develop-
ments on the city's infrastructure."237
Likewise, the IP found that the safeguards to appraise the "im-
plications for water supply, sewers, and urban drainage, which ought
to have been in place via OD 4.01, were by-passed. Thus, Management
[was] not in compliance with the requirements of OD 4.01."238 More
generally, the Panel found that the Bank's management failed to con-
sider the effects of the resettlement sites on the global urban
framework within the dam and reservoir's area. This too, the IP ob-
served, was out of compliance with OD 4.30239 and OD 4.01.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at xiii.
235. "Peri-urban" . . . refers to . . . units close to town. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, Urban and Peri-Urban Agriculture (undated), http://
www.fao.org/unfaolbodies/coag/coagl5/x0076e.htm#2.http://www.fao.org/unfaolbodies/CO
AG/COAG15/X0076e.htm
236. See, See, Paraguay - Reform Project, supra note 114, at xiii ("Before bringing the
Second Yacyretd Project to the Board for approval in 1992, the Bank had a full
environmental assessment prepared.").
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. ("OD 4.30 requires that after the area affected by the project and the displaced
population have been identified, the host government ensure that persons ineligible for
compensation do not come into the identified affected area. In the Yacyreti project, there
has been a large influx of people into the area.") For the specific language of OD 4.30 on
Involuntary Resettlement, See generally, IFC Environment and Social Development
Department, Handbook for Preparing a Resettlement Action Plan (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/09/13/
000094946 02090404022144/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. IFC Operational Directive OD
4.30 on Involuntary Resettlement, at 67. Some of the items that the Bank's Management is
required to assess under OD 4.30 include whether Bank Managers: (1) Consulted with
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Nevertheless, the IP noted, that within the framework of the
"Programa Desborde de Arroyos" ("PDA"), or the "Program for Over-
flowing Urban Creeks" the IBRD's Management advised EBY to
coordinate resettlement in its urban development plans. 24 0 Nonethe-
less, within the perspective of the PDA - the Urban Creeks
Program, 2 4 1 the Panel noted that management informed EBY's direc-
tors that they should coordinate resettlement issues within the urban
development plans, which the Bank did.24 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
The saga of the Yacyretd Dam displacement of what euphemis-
tically are called project-affected people is a decades' long string of
violations by EBY, on behalf of Argentina and Paraguay, which were
suborned by both the IBRD and the IADB. These long-term violations
of both the human and environmental rights of the poor on both sides
of the Parand River are predominantly attributable to both banks.
They promulgated rules and operational procedures, loaned the money
to the governments and to EBY, and are able to structure the terms of
these transactions to comport with the human rights and environmen-
tal terms that the banks assert that they are governed by.
Indeed, the fact that two separate formal evaluations by the IP
and the IIM of two requests for inspections of EBY's actions, above and
beyond the protests, letter writing campaigns and entreaties to their
governments and the banks, leaves one wondering why such neglect
takes place. Is it due to corruption, abandonment of moral obligations,
or disregard for human beings? Whatever the reason, or reasons, the
banks are not powerless to change the status quo. Rather, like puppe-
teers, they control the totality of the entire lending process. If these
banks actually care about human rights and the state of the environ-
ment, as opposed to only having their loans repaid, the burden is upon
their managements and directors to demonstrate by deeds rather than
words that they are concerned. Consequently, the development banks
must put their foot down and demand more. Otherwise their govern-
locals regarding resettlement activities; (2) provided those who were resettled with timely
compensation for lost chattels and other property at full replacement cost; (3) provided
those who were to be resettled with alternative sites for relocation; (4) provided those who
were to be resettled with resettlement-assistance, if required; and (5) those who were
resettled were restored to-livelihoods whose standards. Id. at 26.
240. Id. at 49, 147.
241. Id. at xxiv.
242. Id. at 49, 147.
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ment members/shareholders243 must take the initiative to push the
Banks to do what is right and proper.
243. Since most countries are members of the United Nations they are governed by the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://
www.un .orglen/documents/udhr/index.shtml. See e.g. pmbl., which provides "Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Whereas
disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as
the highest aspiration of the common people . . .".
